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        The degenerate regimes and individuals have been a neglected topic in the literature on Plato’s 
moral psychology in the Republic. This thesis contributes to the currently limited literature on 
degradation, and explores the following issues in the interpretation of Plato: the validity of the 
city-soul analogy across all regimes, including both the just city and the unjust cities, the cause of 
degradation, and the bad-making feature in the degenerate regimes. In defense of my account of 
the badness of degradation, I also examine the hydraulic model of desire, and offer an 
interpretation that resolves an apparent tension between the model and Plato’s account of the 
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        In the Republic1, Plato argues that being just is more beneficial than being unjust. In his effort 
to define justice, he constructs an ideal city, kallipolis, in order to identify the virtue of justice in 
it. Later he offers a theory about the constitution of the soul and describes the condition of the soul 
required for a just person. Plato applies his theories about the soul to the ideal city and the just 
person as well as to four degraded cities, aiming to demonstrate that the people in the unjust cities 
are worse-off than the just person in kallipolis. This thesis examines Plato’s moral psychology in 
the context of the degenerate regimes. Much of the literature on Plato’s moral psychology, such as 
the work by Hendrick Lorenz2 and Christopher Bobonich3, focuses on the virtuous person and the 
just city, while the unjust people and the degenerate regimes have been relatively neglected.4 
Although virtue is a central focus in Plato’s philosophy, the degenerate regimes and the unjust 
rulers are the main topics of Republic Book VIII and IX. Hence, as an integral part in Plato’s 
discussion in the Republic, the degenerate regimes can play a significant role in the examination 
of Plato’s moral psychology. In recent years, scholars like Mark Johnstone,5 Zena Hitz,6 and Ezra 
Gavrielides7 have contributed to topics on the degenerate regimes, including the structure of the 
																																																						
1 This thesis is based on the Grube edition of Plato’s Republic.   
2 Lorenz (2009, Part One) investigates the rational and non-rational motivation in Plato’s theory. 
The investigation is conducted through examining the tripartite soul theory, which Plato 
discusses as part of the description of the just person. Lorenz does not examine how the tripartite 
soul theory applies to the unjust individuals in the degraded cities.     
3 Bobonich (2002, I.11-I.13) discusses the (possibility of possessing) virtues, ultimate ends, and 
happiness of the non-philosophers. The discussion about the non-philosophers is structured 
around the features of the philosophers—only the philosophers with the right ends can possess 
virtue and live a happy life—instead of the vice of the non-philosophers.   
4 This point has been helpfully brought up by Zena Hitz (2010).  
5 Johnstone (2013), Johnstone (2015). 




soul of the degenerate characters, the relation between the structure of the soul and degeneration 
of the regimes, and the bad-making feature of the degenerate regimes. I aim to contribute to the 
current discussion with this thesis, for I believe that we stand to gain from the investigation of the 
degenerate regimes as much as we stand to benefit from examining the just city.   
        This thesis examines several key interpretive issues surrounding the debate of the degenerate 
regimes. Part One focuses on the city-soul analogy, which is a key premise in Plato’s account for 
the just city and the just individual. I explore how the city-soul analogy should be construed and 
applied to the degenerate regimes and establish the overall validity of the analogy across all 
regimes. The city-soul analogy functions as an important explanatory tool in the rest of the thesis. 
Part Two answers two questions regarding degradation: what is the cause of degradation and why 
are the degenerate regimes bad. I offer a unified account for the cause of degradation and propose 
an alternative account of badness of degradation to Gavrielides (2010)’s account. Part Three 
resolves a potential tension between Plato’s “hydraulic model” of desire8 and my proposal, and 















Introduction       
										In the Republic, Plato introduces an analogy that relates the characteristics of a city with the 
characteristics of the soul of its citizens in order to ascertain a correct conceptualization of justice. 
In Book II, Plato takes on the task of investigating justice and injustice to demonstrate that the 
former is more beneficial than the latter. To initiate the investigation of justice, he proposes that it 
would be easier to seek an understanding of justice as it relates to the city in order to subsequently 
seek an understanding of justice as it relates to the individual, for the former supposedly has more 
justice due to its larger size (368e-369a). This proposal shifts the focus of the following two books 
(II-III) from individual justice to political justice, and sets up for the construction of kallipolis, the 
ideal city that is completely good, and therefore where justice, along with all other virtues, must 
be found. In Book IV, upon completing the construction of kallipolis, Plato searches for justice 
among the virtues in the city and gives a tentative definition of justice in the city (“the having and 
doing of one’s own”) (434a). To complete the inquiry into justice, the next step is to ascertain 
whether a similar kind of thing can be accepted as justice in the individual and finalizing this 
definition. This is where the city-soul analogy, which functions to bridge political justice and 
individual justice, first appears. At 435e, Plato points out that each of the citizen must have the 
same parts and characteristics as the city, because it is hard to imagine where else the 
characteristics of a city come from, if not from its people. He uses Thracians and Scythians as 
examples of spirited people who give spiritedness to their cities, and Phoenicians and Egyptians 
as examples of money-lovers who install a love of money in their city. It then follows that justice 
in kallipolis must also come from the just people in it. If this is the case, justice in the individual 
		
8	
will be found through the examination of their souls. The analogy raised here is intuitively true. It 
lays out the foundation for a more elaborate analogy between the structural features in the just city 
and the just soul. Plato then introduces the tripartite soul theory, according to which the soul 
consists of three parts (appetite, spirit, and reason), each corresponding to one of the three classes 
in the ideal city (producers, guardians, and rulers). In a just soul, the relationship between the three 
parts and their respective features resemble those of the three classes in the just city.  
        The identification of justice in the city and the individual concludes the investigation of 
justice (one that is as rigorous as it can be without appealing to the more complex philosophy and 
mathematics in Book V-VI), and the city-soul analogy does not appear again until Book VIII, 
when Plato returns to the debate regarding the benefits of justice and introduces the other four 
types of political regimes and their corresponding human characters. Although Plato seems to 
believe that there could be an indefinite number of political constitutions9, he claims that only four 
types other than aristocracy (exemplified by kallipolis) are worth discussing (544a). All four 
constitutions are unjust and together they represent a gradual degradation of the just city. Since 
Plato aims to demonstrate that it is more beneficial for the individual to be just instead of unjust, 
the city-soul analogy is once again invoked in order to connect the discussion of the city with that 
of the corresponding individual. At 544d, Plato argues that there should exist “as many forms of 
human characters as there are of constitutions”, because constitutions must be born from the 
characters of the people “who live in the cities governed by them…and drag the rest along with 
them.” Therefore, the description of each degraded constitution is accompanied by a description 
of an individual with the corresponding character. Furthermore, besides the apparent resemblance 
between the constitution and the character of the individual, there also exist some structural 
																																																						
9 I use the words “regime”, “constitution”, and “city” interchangeably in this thesis.  
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similarities between the city and the corrupted individual’s soul (not unlike the relationship 
between kallipolis and the souls of its citizens). For example, a tyrannical city is ruled by a single 
ruler (a tyrant), and the soul of a tyrannical person is ruled by a single lawless erotic desire. 
However, unlike kallipolis, none of the degraded cities seem to have three distinctive social classes 
that correspond with the three soul parts. Moreover, the condition of the soul of the four types of 
individuals is not clearly explained. It is not immediately apparent what role each soul part plays 
in the degenerate souls. The description of the unjust constitutions and their corresponding 
individuals is completed in Book IX, where Plato concludes that the happiness of the city and the 
corresponding individual declines as the constitution declines (580c). 
        The two articulations of the city-soul analogy in Book IV and Book VIII seem to suggest at 
least two different levels of analogy between the city and the souls of the citizens. The first level, 
as proposed in Book IV, is the analogy between the characteristics of the city and the 
characteristics of each of its citizens. The examples he uses (Thracians, Scythians, Egyptians etc.) 
imply that it is possible for all people in a city to share a universal character, which in turn gives 
rise to the character of the city. However, this is not necessarily the case with the five types of 
constitutions described in the Republic. To begin with, it is not clear that the just city kallipolis 
consists of only just people. Plato sets a rather high standard for the just soul: in order for a person 
to have a just soul, reason must be the naturally strongest part in the soul; the person whose reason 
is naturally the strongest must be raised in a way that is proper for her nature, which includes strict 
physical training and education in poetry and music; such education will then put her soul in the 
right condition, where reason rules over appetite with the assistance of spirit (441e-442b). Since 
reason is the naturally strongest soul part only for a small number of people, namely the rulers, it 
is unclear whether the rest of the city (producers and guardians) also have justice in their soul. 
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Since Book IV provides no direct description of the soul of the other two classes, one must use 
speculation to decide the condition of their souls from indirect evidence. It is known that the 
guardians are characterized by their love of honor and warfare, which makes them naturally suited 
to engage in warfare, and the producers are characterized by their love of materials and money, 
which makes them the money-makers in the city. It seems natural to assume that the guardians’ 
souls are ruled by spirit and the producers’ souls are ruled by appetite. If this is indeed the case, 
then the city-soul analogy cannot be interpreted as the analogy between the characteristics of a city 
and those of all of its citizens, but perhaps only as an analogy between the city and its rulers. This 
kind of interpretation constitutes the second level of analogy and is supported by the articulation 
of the city-soul analogy in Book VIII, which suggests that the characteristics of a city come from 
the people that govern the city and “drag the rest along with them” (544e). Although this 
interpretation appears to be a solution to the problem for kallipolis, it cannot yet be readily accepted 
as the final say on the issue. On one hand, admitting that the analogy exists between only the rulers 
and the city may create a bigger problem for kallipolis—since the rulers of the city are in the 
minority, it would then follow that the just city consists largely of unjust people, which is certainly 
problematic. This is the challenge famously raised by Bernard Williams. On the other hand, the 
introduction of the other four constitutions complicates matters. Unlike kallipolis, the other 
constitutions do not necessarily have stable rulers and/or social structures. Indeed, each one 
gradually degrades until it becomes a worse type of constitution. Tyranny is possibly exempt from 
this process, since tyranny is the last stage in degradation process. However it is worth noting that 
even the tyrant undergoes changes in the soul. The education system and institution of kallipolis 
ensure that only just people, who have true knowledge and are capable of right judgment, will be 
selected rulers. Therefore, the social class structure of kallipolis will remain intact, at least until 
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the ruler eventually makes a mistake, due to sense perception, which leads to the decline of 
kallipolis (546b). In the other constitutions, there is no such institution to ensure stability. In 
democracy, for example, the ruler is constantly changing and the nature of the soul of each ruler 
is uncertain—money-lovers and honor-lovers have the same chance at ruling as those who are 
naturally suited to rule (but would not have the right upbringing to become real philosopher kings). 
Before comparing the character of the ruler to the city, it would be difficult to decide what the 
character of the ruler is in a democracy in the first place. Therefore, neither of the possible 
interpretations is without problems. 
    The purpose of this chapter is to work out an interpretation of the city-soul analogy that can 
sufficiently account for potential discrepancies between the analogy and Plato’s description of the 
five types of constitution and their corresponding individuals. In order to achieve this goal, this 
chapter will examine how the analogy is drawn in each type of constitution in order to reach an 
interpretation that can be consistently applied to different types of constitutions. The two 
articulations of the analogy in Book IV and VIII will serve as a starting point for the examination 
to provide a tentative account of the analogy. After examining this tentative account in each type 
of constitution, I will make necessary revisions to the account so that it is consistent with the 
descriptions of the constitutions and their corresponding individual.  
        Based on the accounts of the city-soul analogy in Book IV and VIII, the two possible 
conditions of the city-soul analogy can be summarized as follow: 
(1) A city has the same characteristics as does the soul of the ruler(s) within the city; 
(2) A city has the same characteristics as does the soul of the non-rulers of the city. 
It is important to note that (1) and (2) do not directly correspond to the two kinds of analogy in 
Book IV and VIII. The Book IV account posits both (1) and (2), and the analogy in Book VIII 
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posits only (2). Since the truth of (1) and (2) entails the truth of (2), it would be easier to examine 
(1) and (2) as separate conditions and avoid the redundancy of examining both (1) & (2) and (2). 
Since the truthfulness of (1) and the truthfulness of (2) are not inter-entailing, it is easy to see that 
there exist four possible results of the examination in each type of constitution: 1.  (1) is true and 
(2) is not true, 2.  both (1) and (2) are true (in which case both the analogies in Book IV and VIII 
are right), 3. (1) is not true and (2) is true (in which case the analogy in Book IV is not right but 
the analogy in Book VIII is right), and 4. both (1) and (2) are not true (in which case the city-soul 
analogy is inconsistent with Plato’s description of the constitution). Although 4. is listed as a 
possible result, it is highly unlikely to appear. If 4. indeed occurs in any of the constitutions, then 
the city-soul analogy will fail as a tool to bridge the characteristics of the city and that of its people, 
which means that the characteristics of a city do not necessarily resemble those of its people and 
justice or injustice in the city do not necessarily entail justice or injustice in the individual. Plato 
will have to prove that being just is more beneficial than being unjust using a different approach. 
The current approach examines the happiness of each type of individual that corresponds with each 
type of constitution and ranks their happiness along with the justice/injustice of the city. Moreover, 
as stated above, Plato’s claim that the characteristics of a city must come from its people has an 
intuitive appeal and holds at least some kind of truth. It would be counter-intuitive to arrive at a 
conclusion that suggests little to no similarity between the people and their city. The aim of this 
chapter will be to preserve the consistency of the city-soul analogy with the rest of the text in the 
Republic. Now that the tentative account and possible results of the examination are clear, the 
process of the examination of each city can be roughly outlined as follow: 1. to identify the 
characteristics of the city, 2. to identify the characteristics of the person that corresponds with the 
city, and 3. to compare the rulers and non-rulers in the city to the person in step 2 and decide if 
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their characteristics are analogous to those of the city. This process may vary for each constitution 
depending on the available textual evidence, but it can nevertheless serve as a guideline for the 
following sections.  
         As will be demonstrated in the following sections, condition (1) applies in all types of 
constitution except democracy, which lacks a single leadership; and condition (2) applies to almost 
all constitutions, although the degree of resemblance between the citizens and the constitution may 
vary.  
I. Aristocracy and the Williams Challenge 
        Aristocracy, exemplified by kallipolis, is the first and the only just constitution in the 
Republic. Kallipolis is constructed as the ideal city in which all virtues, including justice, must be 
found. The most distinctive characteristics of kallipolis are therefore the four virtues: wisdom, 
courage, moderation, and justice (427e), which come from the unique social structure and 
educational system in kallipolis. Three social classes exist in kallipolis: producers (craftsmen), 
auxiliary guardians (soldiers), and complete guardians (rulers). Each class consists of people who 
are naturally best suited to practice their designated craft. The producer class, which is the majority 
in the city, is composed of appetitive people with a love of money. Hence, the members of the 
producing class are the money-makers in the city. The auxiliary guardians are spirited people with 
a love of honor. The complete guardians are the ones with the most valuable nature and have a 
love of learning. The educational system of kallipolis ensures that the complete guardians, who 
are born with the rarest, best nature (both spirited and philosophical), receive the best education. 
This education serves to instill within them a sense of order through the right kind of poetry and 
music, so that they can guard the established system and its values and guard against internal and 
external enemies. In his discussion of the four virtues, Plato points out that kallipolis is wise 
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because of the knowledge possessed by the rulers, which is about the maintenance of the city as a 
whole (428d); it’s courageous because of the power of the auxiliary guardians to preserve the laws 
of the city through pains, pleasures, desires, or fears (429d); and it’s moderate because of the 
agreement between the naturally better and naturally worse about who is to rule in the city (432a). 
Justice, as it turns out, is doing one’s own work and not meddling with what is not one’s own 
(433b). The city is therefore just because each individual has and does their own. 
        The three-part structure of the city and the four virtues are perfectly mirrored in the just 
people. It is important to recognize, however, that since every soul consists of three parts (but not 
every city has three classes), the key analogy between the just city and the just soul is the relation 
and functioning of the three parts, instead of the mere existence of the three parts. According to 
the tripartite soul theory, each person has three parts10 in her soul: appetite, spirit, and reason. 
Appetite is the part that gives rise to bodily and material desires (439d); it is also the largest and 
the most insatiable part of the soul (442a). Spirit is the part that gives rise to emotion, especially 
the sense of honor, anger, and shame; it’s the natural ally of reason, perhaps because one is easily 
angered if treated unjustly. Reason is the part in charge of rational calculation (439d); it holds back 
appetite, which seeks for instantaneous satisfaction of desires, and decides what is best for the 
person in the long run. The love of money comes from appetite, the love of honor comes from 
spirit, and the love of learning comes from reason. Since a just person, like the just city, is 
completely good, she will also possess the same four virtues. Like in the just city, justice in the 
soul is each part doing its own work, which requires reason to rule, spirit to be its ally, and appetite 
to be ruled (441e). A just person would be wise because of the knowledge possessed by reason 
																																																						
10 Plato seems to allow more parts in the soul at certain places—maybe Plato thinks that it’s 




regarding what is good for each part and for the whole soul (442c), courageous because of the 
spirit’s preservation of reason’s judgement about the right object of fear through pains and pleasure		
(442c), and moderate because of the common belief of each part that reason should rule, which 
makes the soul parts harmonious and friendly with each other (442c). 
        The question that arises now is whether the rulers and non-rulers in kallipolis respectively are 
just people, whose characteristics are analogous to those of the just city. There is little controversy 
on the fact that the rulers of kallipolis are just people, since they are the ones who have the strongest 
love of learning, and receive the best education that conditions their souls in the right way. At 
441e, Plato points out that the necessary condition for a just soul is “a mixture of music and poetry, 
on the one hand, and physical training, on the other, that make the two parts (reason and spirit) 
harmonious, stretching and nurturing the rational part with fine words and learning, relaxing the 
other part (spirit) through soothing stories, and making it gentle by means of harmony and rhythm”. 
This is exactly the kind of training that complete guardians receive from birth according to Book 
II and III. We can thereby infer from this passage that the complete guardians’ soul parts are put 
in order and harmony as a result of their training and education. Furthermore, the complete 
guardians of kallipolis possess the knowledge of what is best for the city, and are able to discern 
what is just from what is unjust. According to Book VI, this kind of knowledge about justice must 
be derived from knowledge of the Forms, which makes all just things useful and beneficial (505a). 
In other words, a complete guardian’s knowledge about how to maintain a just city must come 
from her knowledge of the form of the good, which also includes the knowledge about how to 
main one’s soul in a proper way. Therefore, both their education and their knowledge about the 
city necessarily entail that the rulers of kallipolis have the right conditioning for a just soul and the 
knowledge to regulate their soul justly, which make them just people whose characteristics 
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resemble those of their city. Condition (1) of the tentative account of the analogy thus applies in 
kallipolis. 
     Unlike the rulers of kallipolis, it is difficult to determine the condition of the soul of the non-
rulers in kallipolis, especially the condition of the soul of the producer class. As I pointed out in 
the introduction, since the producers and craftsmen are money makers in the city, which is 
determined by their money-loving nature, it is natural to assume that these people’s souls are ruled 
by the appetitive part and that their souls are not just like those of their rulers. The possibility that 
the producer class’s soul is ruled by appetite gives rise to the famous challenge by Bernard 
Williams11. Williams points out that the city-soul analogy posits that a city is F if and only if its 
men are F and the explanation of a city’s being F is the same as that of a man’s being F. In the case 
of kallipolis, the explanation of a man’s being just refers to the special condition of his soul, the 
condition being that each part does its job, which entails reason’s rule over spirit and appetite. In 
order for the explanation of a man’s justice to be the same the explanation of a city’s justice, the 
just city must also have the equivalent three parts (reason, spirit, and appetite). According to Plato, 
the majority of men in the just city are money-makers, whose souls are ruled by appetite. A 
contradiction thereby arises, since the just city has a majority of unjust men. 
        Williams’s challenge rests on the premise that the souls of the money makers in kallipolis are 
ruled by appetite, which at first glance seems to be true. However, nowhere in the Republic has 
Plato explicitly described the condition of the soul of these people, probably because of their less 
important role in the city. All that’s known for sure about them is that they are naturally suited to 
be producers and craftsmen, due to a lack of spirit and reason in their souls, which merely indicates 
that their appetite is stronger than spirit and reason by nature, but does not necessarily mean that 
																																																						
11 Williams (1973). 
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their soul is ruled by appetite. The reason behind this claim is that the power status of a soul part 
(or a set of desires in the soul) does not always depend on its natural strength or size, but largely 
on a person’s upbringing and the education that she receives. Plato’s emphasis on the upbringing 
and education of youths is seen throughout the Republic. He believes that even the (naturally) best 
soul (in fact, especially the naturally best soul) is corruptible if the person is surrounded by the 
wrong kind of people and does not engage in the right kind of activity (philosophy). In Book IX, 
Plato describes a type of lawless desire that is savage and beastly and seeks to gratify itself when 
the owner of the soul goes to sleep (571b). Judged by the gruesome content of the desire and the 
frequency of their appearance in dreams, they are the worst and strongest desires if not controlled 
by reason. These lawless desires are “probably present in everyone” (571b), even “in those of us 
who seem to be entirely moderate or measured” (572b), “but they are held in check by the laws 
and better desires in alliance with reason” (571b). In fact, the tyrants in Book IX who eventually 
admits these desires into the soul are supposedly those with the better natures—they become the 
target of the drones who corrupt them precisely because of their superior nature. The tyrants may 
as well have souls that are naturally suited for philosophy and obtaining knowledge of the Good, 
but the city that they live in drags them to the opposite direction. This shows that the natural 
strength of a soul part or a set of desires in the soul does not necessarily align with its actual power 
status in the soul. A person whose lawless desires may not naturally be the strongest can be 
corrupted by her environment so that these desires completely dominate the soul, whereas another 
person who is naturally imbued with these same desires can be shaped by fine learning to suppress 
these desires when she is awake and gradually eliminate them even in sleep (571c). 
        What then, is the power status of each of the soul parts in the producer’s soul? Unfortunately, 
as is said above, no definitive evidence exists. However, it must be recognized that the producer 
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class is performing their own job, and not meddling with others’ work in the city, as a result of 
their agreement that the complete guardians should rule. In other words, they participate in and 
contribute to the moderation and justice of the city. The question to be asked then becomes: can a 
person who contributes to the moderation and justice of the city have an unjust soul? Book IV 
provides some kind of answer to the question at 442b, specifically that the well-nurtured reason 
and spirit will watch over appetite so that it does not become so big and strong such that it no 
longer does its own work but attempts to ruler over the other soul parts, “thereby overturning 
everyone’s whole life”. It seems that according to this passage, a soul ruled by appetite would not 
only cause chaos in the soul but also disturb the order of the city. It could well be the case that the 
“everyone” in the text is a metaphorical term that refers to the soul parts instead of citizens, since 
Plato also uses “class” to refer to the soul parts instead of the actual social class in the city. 
However, even if that is the case, it is hard to imagine that someone whose soul is ruled by appetite 
(and therefore is in chaos) would be willing to accept the ruling of the complete guardians, who 
constantly restrain their desires (the rulers guard against wealth so that the producers do not 
become so rich that they stop performing their crafts). One potential objection could be that the 
complete guardians and auxiliaries rule over the producers and craftsmen by force, and the 
producers are merely compelled to obey the rulers, instead of willingly accept their ruling, but that 
doesn’t seem like the case with kallipolis. For one thing, the guardians are told the Myth of the 
Metal from youth so that they love and treat their people as brothers and sisters (415a-d). 
Additionally, moderation in kallipolis entails that both the better class (rulers) and the worse class 
(producers) agree that it is best for the city if the complete guardians rule and the worse class does 
not start civil wars against the rulers in order to gain power in the city. Therefore, there is reason 
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to believe that the producers’ souls are ruled by reason instead of appetite, which allows them to 
engage in their designated crafts and agree with the arrangement of the city without revolting. 
        If the producers’ souls are indeed ruled by reason, it must be explained in what way their 
reason can rule, since their reason is a naturally weak soul part. Although it is counter-intuitive to 
say that a soul can be ruled by its weaker (or weakest) soul part, it is nevertheless not inconceivable. 
One proposal by Ferrari12 can be helpful for understanding how this might be possible. Ferrari 
argues that the producers are just people, and their souls are just insofar as they are ruled by the 
reason of the rulers. Ferrari believes that the reason of the producers by itself is too weak to rule, 
yet it does not mean that the producers are unjust people. The justice of their soul comes from their 
willing obedience to the rule of the ruler’s reason, which is strong enough to be the proper ruler of 
a soul. Ferrari’s proposal holds certain appeal, since it solves the Williams challenge by finding a 
way for the producers to be just. Nevertheless, according to this proposal, the producers’ souls are 
just in virtue of their relations to other people’s souls, which is unsatisfying because it does not 
answer which part is ruling in their own souls. A small revision to his proposal would be that the 
producers’ souls are just because their reason is ruling in their souls with the help of the reason of 
the rulers, which makes up for the weakness of the producers’ reason. It is true that the producers 
do not have the proper knowledge to decide what is the best for themselves. Their lack of 
knowledge is determined by the natural lacking in their rational part. However, the institution of 
kallipolis makes the rulers, who have the knowledge, aid the producers’ reason by supplying it 
with true beliefs. With the supervision and instruction from the rulers, the producers’ reason can 
rise to the highest power status in the soul and rule over its naturally strongest part (appetite). This 
is the way that a producer can be just without having a naturally strong rational part in the soul. 
																																																						
12 Ferrari (2003), p.44. 
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        It has now been shown that both the non-rulers and the rulers in kallipolis are just individuals, 
with a particular kind of relation between their soul parts that resemble the relation between the 
classes in the city. Some may still question whether the non-rulers are in fact just individuals, since 
their proposed way of achieving justice is significantly different (and lacking) compared to the 
justice of the rulers. Admittedly, this kind of questioning is justified, but it is not devastating to the 
argument above. It is true that the justice of the producers is not the same as the justice of the 
rulers. This kind of discrepancy should be expected based on their distinct nature. However, it is 
unrealistic to require a city that consists of different kinds of people to reach the same level of 
justice among all of its citizens or to assert that there is only one way of achieving justice in one’s 
soul. At the beginning of Book IV, Plato points out that in a happy city, each class should be as 
happy as their nature is allowed. It is wrong to make a single class so happy that they become 
something that they are not. The same line of argument can be applied to justice. In constructing a 
just city, the goal is not to make any one class particularly just, but to make the city just as a whole. 
As for the justice in the individual, it should be left to nature to provide each group with their share 
of justice, whether it is large or small. It may be the case that the justice in producers is not as 
much or as “pure” as the justice in rulers, but it would be wrong to claim that the producers are 
unjust. In kallipolis, each class is as just as their nature allows, which is sufficient to make the city 
a just city.  
II. Timocracy 
        After aristocracy, timocracy is the second-best constitution. It comes to be as a result of the 
mixing of iron and bronze types into the ruling class. The most distinctive features of timarchy are 
the love of victory and love of honor, due to the predominance of the spirited element in the city 
(548c). Timocracy emerges after the rulers of aristocracy, who inevitably rely on their fallible 
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sensory perception, make a mistake about breeding in the city, which leads to the mixing of iron 
and bronze type into the gold ruling class. The two kinds of rulers pull the constitution towards 
different directions: one towards moneymaking and acquisition of property and the other towards 
virtue and the old order. After struggling with one another, the two types of rulers compromise on 
a middle way, which is to engage in warfare and enslave the people whom the rulers used to treat 
as brothers (the lower classes) (547b). In the new constitution, spirited people will be chosen as 
rulers, because the original ruling class (the wise ones) are now mixed. The rulers will have a 
secret pleasure with spending other people’s money although they will still live communally 
(548b). At the same time, they will value physical training more than music and poetry and 
therefore their education will be by force (548b).   
        A man whose characteristics correspond those of the timocracy is obstinate and not very well 
trained in music and poetry (548e). He will be harsh to slaves, gentle to free people, and obedient 
to rulers out of his love of ruling and a love of honor (549b).  He will develop a love of money as 
he grows older. His attitude towards virtue won’t be pure (549b). All of this is caused by the lack 
of reason in his soul to guard against improper desires and preserve his virtue (549b). He is raised 
by a good father who tries to be just in an unjust city and a mother who blames the father for not 
meddling with other people’s affair to gain honor. The son thereby settles in the middle part and 
becomes a proud and honor-loving man (549d-550b). 
        Since timocracy is a constitution that gradually declines from aristocracy, its ruling class and 
social structure must also undergo gradual change to reach a relatively stable state, although none 
of the unjust constitutions will be stable for long, because no city other than kallipolis is in fact 
“one” (422e) and civil war is bound to break out in these constitutions that leads to its degradation 
to a worse constitution. To compare the rulers and non-rulers to the city, one must look at the 
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relatively stable state of the constitution, which is also its most representative state. In its more 
stable state, that is, after the compromise between the bronze and gold classes has been made, the 
ruler of the city will be chosen from the spirited and honor-loving, who are likely to be the youths 
described above. The characteristics of these youths (honor-loving, spirited, untrained in poetry 
and music) correspond with the characteristics of the ruler, who will pull the city towards honor 
loving (note that the servants in these young people’s households also speak highly of honor and 
complain about the fathers like their mothers do). It follows thus that the rulers of timocracy must 
share the characteristics of the city. Therefore, condition (1) applies to timocracy.  
        There is little information on the non-rulers in the city, but it is known from the text that the 
city now consists of a ruling class that engages in warfare and servants and slaves. These servants 
and slaves are the same people who used to be producers and craftsmen in aristocracy, who were 
ruled over but not enslaved by the ruling class. It seems unlikely that the servants and slaves will 
have a spirited nature that makes them honor loving, but as pointed out above, they have adopted 
the timocratic values. Although these people may be naturally more money-loving than the rulers, 
since the rulers do not have reason to guard virtues in the soul, they will eventually become more 
and more money-loving. Thus, at its relatively stable state, the whole city (both the rulers and non-
rulers) will be an honor-loving society with a secret love for money.  
III. Oligarchy 
          Oligarchy comes to be from the timocracy when the timocratic rulers stretch and disobey 
the laws to satisfy their desire for material possessions (550d). The honor-loving men in timocracy 
become money-lovers and the money-loving rulers “make the majority of the others like 
themselves” (550e). In an oligarchy, wealth is valued the most and virtue is valued even less than 
in timocracy (550de). Wealthy people will be chosen as rulers because of the city’s valuing of 
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wealth, and the rulers will establish a wealth qualification that dictates that only people who have 
a certain amount of property are qualified to rule. Several faults exist in an oligarchic city. The 
first is its ill choice of rulers by wealth, instead of by their capability of governing the city (551c). 
The second fault is the necessary division that exists in the city between the rich and the poor who, 
as a result of this division, often plot against each other, which makes the city a split one, instead 
of a whole (551d). The third fault is the city’s inability to guard against external enemies because 
of both the rulers’ fear of uniting the poor into an army and their unwillingness to pay mercenaries 
due to their love of money (551e). The fourth fault is meddling in other people’s affairs, given that 
the same people will be farmers, money-makers, and soldiers simultaneously in the city. Lastly, 
the greatest evil of an oligarchic city is allowing someone to sell all her possessions for money and 
stay in the city as a ruler, when she is in fact nothing but a squanderer (552b). Under this 
constitution, the rulers will be the few people who sell their possession to accumulate wealth, while 
the rest of the city is deprived of their money and becomes beggars or evildoers, as a result of lack 
of education, bad rearing, and bad political institution (552e).  
        A person that resembles the oligarchic constitution is a timocrat’s son who sees his father 
brought to court by false charge and has his property confiscated (553b). Humbled by poverty, the 
son enslaves the formerly ruling part (spirit) in his soul and establishes the money-making part of 
the appetite as the ruler (553c). He will use his reason to calculate how to make more money, and 
his spirit will treat wealth as honorable (553d). He will enslave his unnecessary desires and only 
fulfill the necessary desire for money, make a profit of everything, and hoard his wealth (554a). 
Due to the lack of education, he will also have dronish appetites (some beggarly, others evil), but 
will forcibly hold them in check (554c). This description fits the previous description of the 
oligarchic ruler, who will sell all possessions for money and become one of the few wealthy people 
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in the city. Therefore, rulers of an oligarchy must also be oligarchic individuals who resemble the 
characteristics of the city.  
        As for the rest of the city, they are the ones whose dronish appetites are more manifested than 
the rulers of the city. The majority of the city will be deprived of their wealth and become harmless 
beggars or harmful evildoers in the city. Indeed, except for the rulers, almost everyone is a beggar 
in the city (552e). It is clarified at 559d that the dronish people are ruled by unnecessary desires, 
which refer to the desires that go beyond what is beneficial to one’s well-being and are harmful 
both to the body and to the reason and moderation of the soul. It’s possible that the education 
received by these people is even poorer than that received by the rulers. Alternatively, their reason 
and spirit may be too weak to acquire wealth and satisfy the dronish appetites that make them 
beggars or evildoers in check. Either way, they do not seem to share in the oligarchic value as 
much as the rulers do, even though they may also desire money. This division between the 
oligarchic people and the rest of the citizens is what will eventually cause the decline of the 
oligarchic city. Therefore, it can be concluded that condition (1) applies in oligarchy; condition (2) 
does not apply to the majority of the non-rulers in the city because they are ruled by unnecessary 
desires instead of necessary desires, although they may also have a desire for money.  
IV. Democracy 
        The democratic city comes to be when the poor in oligarchy realizes the physical weakness 
of the rich ruling class, starts a war against the rulers, overthrows them, and gives the victorious 
an equal share in ruling by assigning people to positions of rule by lot (557a). Democracy is a 
constitution characterized by its freedom. The city enjoys full freedom, including freedom of 
speech (557b). Each citizen is licensed to do whatever she wants and arranges her life to her own 
pleasure. Democracy is also the constitution that contains all kinds of constitutions on account of 
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the license it gives to its citizens. In a democracy, each citizen can establish any order she wants 
(557d). There is no requirement to rule or to obey the law (557e). If one wants, one can avoid the 
duty to serve or escape a sentence (558a). Moreover, a democracy completely lacks any established 
value besides freedom and despises the values established in the previous constitutions (virtue, 
honor, and wealth). It distributes equality to equals and unequals alike and does not have a stable 
ruling class (558c).  
        A democratic individual is raised by an oligarchic father and forcefully rules over his non-
money-making, unnecessary desires when he is young (558d). However, because of the extreme 
lack of education, the young boy changes when some of his desires other than the necessary ones 
receive help from the external forces with which he associates (559e). Through the struggle inside 
him between the oligarchic and democratic desires, more desires are nurtured without his 
awareness and they become numerous and strong. These desires eventually occupy his soul since 
his soul lacks the knowledge or truth to guard against them (560b). The democratic man will then 
return to the dronish people who will persuade him that moderation and orderly expenditure are 
“boorish and mean” and continue to instill insolence, anarchy, extravagance, and shamelessness 
in his soul, thereby releasing all useless and unnecessary pleasures (560e). After this, the 
democratic man will treat his necessary and unnecessary desires equally, satisfying any desire that 
comes along as if chosen by lot (561b). He will not accept any word of truth that claims some 
desires are good while others are not and will instead declare that all pleasures are equal (561c). 
        In order to decide whether the rulers and non-rulers in a democracy are also democratic in 
their souls, we must first decide who are the rulers in a democratic city. It has been said that the 
ruler of a democratic city is constantly changing because the constitution provides everyone the 
license to rule. At 564d, Plato claims that a democratic city can be divided into three parts. The 
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first part is the class of idlers, or the dronish people, who also exist in oligarchy but have more 
power in democracy because of the freedom in the constitution. This is the dominant class that 
manages everything in the city (564d). The second class is the naturally organized people who 
make money and become the wealthiest (564e). The last class is the largest group of people who 
work with their own hands and do not participate in politics (565a). It seems that Plato believes 
that, although the freedom of democracy allows anyone willing to rule to manage the city, the 
actual rulers are the dronish people, because the rest of the people do not have the desire to manage 
the city’s affairs. Another interpretation could be that although theoretically anyone can rule in the 
city, the city does not actually have a stable class of rulers with unified goals and values. Each 
person is left to do whatever she wants and there is not a single leadership or a set of functioning 
law in the city, because the so-called “shared value” is in effect the absence of value. If the first 
understanding is adopted, the rulers of a democratic city are not truly democratic because dronish 
people are only occupied by unnecessary desires (and not necessary ones) whereas a democratic 
person treats necessary and unnecessary desires alike. If the second interpretation is adopted, then 
the comparison between the rulers and the city is meaningless for democracy because there is 
simply no ruler in the city. Either way, in the absence of a real ruler in the city, condition (1) does 
not apply in democracy. However, the third class of the city, which is also the majority of the city, 
are the most likely to be democratic since they do not have a unified task in life (either to persuade 
and speak to the crowd like the drones do or make money like the second class). The second class 
are more oligarchic than the third class, but are not true oligarchs, since they do not plot against 
the rest of the city to obtain wealth. It can be inferred that the second class is also democratic 
because there exist unnecessary desires in their souls that prevent them from selling all their 
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possessions for money like true oligarchs do. Therefore, condition (2) applies to the majority of 
the people in democracy.            
V. Tyranny 
        Tyranny is the last type of constitution and the most unjust of the five types of constitution. 
It arises when the drones in a democratic city trick the working class into believing that the money-
makers are oligarchic and are plotting against them, which triggers a war between the people and 
the rich. The people then select and nurture a champion as their leader, who will eventually execute 
the rich on false charges (that they are plotting against the people to restore oligarchy) and promises 
the redistribution of land and the cancellation of debts. The killing of her kindred turns the leader 
into a tyrant (566a). She will continue to stir up wars against the rich (who now wants to execute 
her) and receive protection from the people, who believe that the tyrant’s safety is endangered but 
not their own. The rich will then either flee the city out of fear or get executed and the tyrant will 
thus become a complete tyrant rather than a leader (556d). After the exile of the rich, the tyrant 
will keep stirring up a war so that the people will continue to believe in the necessity of her 
leadership (566e). In an effort to prevent the people from plotting against her, the tyrant will 
impoverish the people by forcing them to pay war taxes (567a). All those who are brave, large-
minded, knowledgeable, or rich will be purged from the city, so that they won’t be able to 
overthrow her rule (567b). The tyrant will pay the drones as her bodyguards and free slaves in 
order to enlist them in his bodyguard. She will pay them by feeding off the people that give rise to 
her leadership and will not be afraid to use violence against the people, including her own parents,  
if they dare to refuse (569a-b). Ultimately, the people, in trying to avoid enslavement at the hands 
of the rich people, end up being enslaved by the real slaves (569c). 
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        A tyrannical person that resembles tyranny comes to be when she is led to lawlessness by the 
drones that also tried to enchant her father (572d). Her father will come to the aid of the middle 
desires (the democratic desires that treat all desires equally and allows one to enjoy them in 
moderation), and pull her back (572e). When the tyrant-makers cannot keep hold of her, they plant 
an erotic love in her to be the leader of all idle desires like a winged drone (572e). This erotic 
desire will be nurtured to grow as large as possible. When it’s fully grown, the tyrant-makers will 
plant a sting of longing in it, which makes the leader of the soul frenzied (573b). It will find and 
destroy any good or shame in the person until she is purged of moderation and filled with imported 
madness (573b). Clearly, this erotic desire, which is a tyrant in the soul, is analogous to the tyrant 
of the city. The idle desires in the soul will grow alongside the tyrannical one, which will satisfy 
the idle desires by acquiring wealth from every source: first borrowing, expenditure, and then theft 
or robbing by violence against her own parents and the public. Plato states explicitly that tyrannical 
men who are born in a non-tyrannical city will act as bodyguard to some other tyrant or serve as 
mercenaries at wartime (575b). They are the tyrant makers, who create the most tyrannical person 
(575d). It is then clear that, since the ruler in a tyrannical city is a tyrant, condition a must apply to 
tyranny. As for the rest of the city, the majority of the citizens will be the tyrant’s bodyguard, who 
are also tyrannical people according to the description above. It is not clear how many of the 
democratic people that first gave leadership to the tyrant will eventually be left, since the tyrant 
constantly starts war against them and purges any good or knowledge from the city. Since 
democratic people treat necessary and unnecessary desires equally with some moderation, which 
is against the lawlessness in tyranny, they will most probably be forced to obey the tyrant or be 




    It has been demonstrated that the tentative account of the city-soul analogy proposed at the 
beginning of the chapter is mostly consistent with Plato’s description of the five types of 
constitution, although the way in which it applies differs for each constitution. As can be seen 
above, it would be difficult to give a single account of the city-soul analogy that applies to all types 
of constitutions because of the unique condition in each type. In aristocracy, the characteristics of 
the rulers resemble those of the city to a large extent, while the degree of resemblance of the 
characteristics is less in the non-rulers. In the rest of the constitutions, all rulers have characteristics 
that correspond to the characteristics of the city, with the exception of democracy, which lacks a 
single leadership or a constant ruler. The non-rulers in these constitutions mostly consist of people 
that share values similar to those of the city, but lack the ability or opportunity to rule, although 
there are often citizens with different values from the city, who will eventually tip the scale and 
drag the city into civil war and degradation. Clearly, Plato has carefully designed the constitutions 
to resemble the individuals in them, and the city-soul analogy provides a successful tool for his 














Introduction         
       In the first chapter, I established the overall validity of the city-soul analogy, which grants that 
each of the five constitutions has characteristics corresponding with the characteristics of the soul 
of its citizens and/or ruler. Plato’s five constitutions are described in order of decreasing justice. 
The account of the diseased cities begins at 544 in book VIII, where Plato explains to Glaucon the 
other four constitutions worth discussing besides aristocracy. The first diseased city, timocracy, 
exemplified by the Cretan or Laconian, is victory-loving and honor-loving and “is praised by most 
people” (544c). The following city, the oligarchy, “is filled with a host of evils” (544c). The next 
one in order, “antagonistic to [oligarchy]” (544c), is democracy. And the last city is genuine 
tyranny, which surpasses all the previous three in its evils and injustice. These inferior cities come 
to be through a gradual degradation. Each of them comes to exist as the result of the previous one’s 
decline. Based on the city-soul analogy, the corresponding souls degrade by the same order, from 
the timocratic to the tyrannical. To clarify, the degradation of the soul does not happen in an 
individual soul, but takes place across generations. An aristocrat in kallipolis begets a timocrat, a 
timocrat begets an oligarch, and so on.13 
        This chapter seeks to establish a unified account of Plato’s degraded cities. Specifically, this 
chapter aims to address two questions. The first one is: why does each city decline? That is, is 
there a unified account that can explain the cause for each case of degradation? I argue that the 
																																																						
13 The cross-generational degradation of the soul may create a potential problem for the city-soul 
analogy, since degradation happens to an individual city—a city can degrade from timocracy to 
oligarchy to tyranny, but not to an individual soul. However, since the city-soul analogy is not 
the focus of this chapter, I will not examine the implications of this discrepancy here.  
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degradation of kallipolis should be treated differently from that of the other cities and that the 
cause of kallipolis’s degradation is the failure of sensory perception, which tampers with reason’s 
judgment. I argue the cause of degradation in the other cities is the enslavement of reason by spirit 
or appetite, which refers to the situation where reason is forced to take on appetite’s goals. The 
second question is: what’s bad about the degraded cities? I argue that the badness of degradation 
is not exhausted by the fact of degradation and propose that the badness of the degraded cities 
comes from the objects of the degenerate characters’ desires, which increase in number, kind, and 
strength as the city declines.   
I. The Cause of Degradation 
i. Possible Explanations and Their Inadequacies 
        In this section, I consider several possible explanations for degradation and argue that they 
all fail to provide a satisfying answer. I also point out that the degradation of kallipolis may be 
treated separately from other cases in the unified account, given the unique status that Plato gives 
to the ideal city.    
        In some passages, Plato suggests that what destroys the city is the excessive pursuit of what 
a city deems as good (555b, 562b), yet this explanation does not apply to the decay of kallipolis. 
It cannot be the case that the pursuit of justice causes kallipolis to degrade. Nevertheless, the 
unified account may not have to accommodate kallipolis, since there are reasons to treat the 
degradation of kallipolis differently from other cases. Plato considers kallipolis as the only unified 
city – in fact, he believes that kallipolis is the only city that “deserves to be called a city” (422e) – 
because all the other cities suffer from internal division and civil war. Furthermore, unlike other 
constitutions, for kallipolis, degradation is not a direct result of the system. It is precisely the 
disruption of the established system that causes kallipolis’ decay. However, even if kallipolis 
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should be singled out in the unified account, this kind of explanation remains problematic for 
timocracy. At 550d, Plato points out that it is the secret desire for property that leads timocracy to 
degradation, instead of what the city values the most, namely honor. Therefore, although the 
explanation by excessiveness has substantial textual support, it fails as a holistic account of 
degradation. 
        Another potential explanation could be that the city is destroyed as a result of structural 
instability. This explanation again does not work for kallipolis, which has a stable structure as long 
as its established rules are properly followed. We can avoid this problem by treating kallipolis as 
a separate case. A more serious problem with this explanation is that it is essentially question-
begging. To say that a city has an unstable structure is basically the same as to say that it is subject 
to falling apart. One might argue that an unstable structure merely points to the potentiality of 
degradation, but not the actuality of degradation, thus differentiating the two notions. Yet 
accepting this point will invite even more questions: why does a city that lacks stability, which 
entails the potential to degrade, allow that potentiality to become reality?  
        A more fine-tuned version of the structural instability explanation appeals to the tripartite 
soul theory and ties the structural instability to the enslavement of reason in the ruler and/or 
citizens’ soul. It is important to note, however, that there may be some difficulties in regard to 
identifying the same kind of unstable structure in the city. According to the city-soul analogy, 
similar structural problems must also be found in the degraded city, which means that the 
counterpart of reason in the city, namely the wise people whose souls are ruled by reason, must be 
enslaved. Yet it is unclear whether there are any people whose souls are ruled by reason at all in 
the unjust cities, where fine education and correct upbringing that nurture the best soul part don’t 
exist. It could be the case that due to the lack of proper education, those whose reason is naturally 
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the strongest part in the soul in the unjust cities do not end up practicing philosophy. Therefore, 
they do not have knowledge of the Forms that enables right judgments about the governance of 
their soul or their city. If that were indeed the case, then it would seem weird that the enslavement 
of these people can undermine the stability of the city, because they share the wrongly praised 
pursuits with the rest of the city and more importantly, do not possess knowledge that can save the 
city from degradation. However, certain passages caution us against such an interpretation. To 
begin with, Plato does believe that there exist “wise people,” no matter how much knowledge they 
have, in the unjust cities. When timocracy is formed, the city is said to be “afraid to appoint wise 
people as rulers” (547d). One may think that these wise people come from the previous constitution 
of aristocracy, yet even in tyranny, the tyrant must “keep a sharp lookout for anyone who is brave, 
large-minded, knowledgeable, or rich” (567b). This suggests that knowledgeable and wise people 
exist even in the worst city. Furthermore, Plato does grant the possibility that philosophers can 
emerge in unjust cities. Socrates, for example, is a philosopher in a democratic city, even though 
he claims14 that he does not participate in politics and thus may not have knowledge about public 
affairs. At 496a-c, Plato describes the small group of true philosophers that exist despite the 
absence of good education in their city, including the well brought-up character who is kept down 
by exile (presumably the wise one in timocracy), the great souls living in a small city who rightly 
disdain the city’s affairs, those who are too sick to participate in politics, and the few like Socrates, 
who receive daimonic signs. Plato claims that it is best for these people to preserve themselves by 
staying away from politics and engaging only in philosophic work, because they are too weak to 
save the city in which there is no ally in the pursuit of justice. In a just city that is willing to appoint 
																																																						




them as rulers, they will be able to use their knowledge to save both themselves and the city. 
Therefore, even in unjust cities, there are wise people who philosophize and have at least the 
knowledge of the correct ruling of their souls. According to this fine-tuned version of explanation, 
it is the enslavement of these people in the city, and the enslavement of reason in the 
ruler’s/citizens’ soul, that cause the degradation of the city.           
        This more specific version of the structural instability explanation is appealing as a result of 
abundant textual support. In oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny, reason is said to be enslaved by 
appetite (553d, 561b, 573b). One may wonder whether reason is enslaved by spirit in the timocratic 
soul, since spirit is supposedly a natural “ally” of reason (422e). It is odd to conceive of reason as 
being enslaved by its natural ally. This worry can be resolved by the passage at 587a, where Plato 
claims that when one of the parts other than reason gains control, it will compel the other parts to 
pursue its own ends, namely the “alien and untrue pleasure”. Here Plato does not distinguish 
between the case where spirit rules from the case in which appetite rules, which provides reason 
for believing that spirit is only the ally of reason when the soul is properly conditioned. In a badly 
governed soul, spirit can indeed enslave reason in pursuit of its own ends. However, there are more 
concerns about this account. As Gavrielides15 points out: merely stating that reason must rule in 
the soul is uninformative. The same applies to the degradation of the city. It is true that a city in 
which reason/philosophers do not rule is subject to degradation. But what makes the ruling of 
reason/philosophers the only kind of ruling that can ensure stability? The explanation cannot be 
that the philosopher’s ruling is the only kind that prevents the city from degrading. This runs the 
explanation into a circularity—when stability is used to explain the lack of degradation, the 
prevention of degradation cannot be used to explain stability. Therefore, to fully explain the cause 
																																																						
15 Gavrielides (2010), p. 204.  
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of degradation, an account that appeals to reason’s ruling must address the difference between 
reason’s ruling and the other parts’ ruling. 
         In the next two sections, I examine the cause of degradation in kallipolis and the other 
degraded cities respectively, and offer an explanation that can account for the difference between 
reason’s ruling and the other parts’ ruling.  
ii.  The degradation of kallipolis        
         I have pointed out that kallipolis is a unique case as a city that is subject to degradation. The 
first thing that one may wonder about concerning its degradation is how it is possible for the ideal 
city to degrade into a lesser form when Plato seems to have come up with a perfect institution that 
secures the city’s harmony and continuation in the previous books. Plato provides one answer 
when he points out to Glaucon that “the cause of change in any constitution is civil war breaking 
out within the ruling group itself” (545c), which serves as a general account of how degradation 
begins in any city. Yet this account does not explain how and why civil war breaks out within the 
ruling group of the ideal city. Plato goes on to give a more complex explanation of the decay of 
kallipolis. For some reason he imitates the tone of the Muses from the Iliad when he gives the 
explanation, possibly indicating that he believes that he has no authority in this matter and must 
appeal to a higher power to solve the predicament16. Plato first appeals to the principle that 
“everything that comes into being must decay” (546a). Then he states that even though the leaders 
of kallipolis are wise, because they rely on sensory perception for their calculation of the right 
																																																						
16 The true reason for which Socrates speaks from the Muses is unclear, yet there exists textual 
support for this interpretation. At 382c, Socrates claims that falsehoods in words are useful in the 
stories when one does not know the truth about the ancient events involving the gods, and “by 
making a falsehood as much like the truth as (one) can”, one makes the falsehood useful. It could 
be the case that Plato is telling a falsehood about the Muses, which he does not really know the 




timing of reproduction, they will eventually make a mistake about “the fertility and barrenness of 
the human species”, and “beget children when they ought not to do so” (546a). Plato includes a 
complex arithmetical account of the birth of a noble child, which requires “a cycle comprehended 
by a perfect number” (546a). The arithmetical account given here is confusing at best, but passages 
from Book V may shed light on the kinds of mistakes that the rulers can potentially make, which 
lead to the city’s decay.   
        At 459, Plato elaborates on the marriage and breeding rules that the rulers must enforce in the 
city for the optimal offspring and the proper size of the city. The duties of the rulers are multi-step 
and deal not only with abstract mathematical calculation, but also with observation and 
understanding of material factors. Plato first highlights the importance of breeding from the best 
ones in their prime as much as possible to produce the best offspring, which requires the rulers to 
prioritize those with the best nature when they select candidates for marriage. Besides determining 
the nature and age of the people, rulers also need to decide the number of marriages, with the aim 
of keeping the number of males stable, so that the city remains a proper size17. In the process, the 
rulers must consider factors like war, disease, and other things that might affect the population.  
        The emphasis on the right size of the population helps to explain the mathematical account in 
Book VIII, specifically helping to explain why correct calculation is crucial to breeding. However, 
the calculation does not merely involve mathematical knowledge, about which the rulers 
supposedly do not err. It also involves the knowledge of people’s age, the possibility of war and 
disease, and so on. On one hand, the rulers may not have the accurate information about certain 
empirical facts. For example, they may not know the correct age of all the citizens because the 
birth time is sometimes wrongly recorded, which is a common human mistake. On the other hand, 
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some of the factors concern uncertain possibilities in the future. Although the rulers can do the 
right math about the ideal number of citizens, they necessarily rely on perceptual evidence to 
predict political climate and public health, which is largely an estimation of chance without a 
definite, correct answer. Moreover, since factors such as war and disease are highly contingent, 
without an essential nature, and subject to the influence of many other factors beyond the rulers’ 
control, they do not participate in the Forms, which are the proper object of knowledge. The nature 
of these factors indicates that it is not the rulers’ reasoning ability that causes mathematical 
mistakes, but the fact that they must reason about unintelligible things, which are the object of 
sensory perception instead of reason. Since sensory perception is by nature fallible and misleading, 
it is bound to cause mistakes. Therefore, the degradation of kallipolis is caused by the rulers’ 
fallible sensory perception, which tampers with reason’s calculation and judgments.   
iii. The Degradation of Other Cities 
        Following the description of the decay of kallipolis, Plato begins his discussion of the unjust 
constitutions and the corresponding individuals, which I have recounted in the previous chapter. 
Plato gives elaborate descriptions of the degradation of each constitution, yet it is difficult to 
identify a universal cause of degradation that applies in each case. For timocracy, it seems that it 
is the rulers’ secret desire for property that destroys the city, since the rulers will bend the laws for 
their pursuit of wealth and drag the rest of the city towards money-loving (550d-e). For oligarchy, 
Plato suggests that it degrades to democracy because of its insatiable desire for what it sets as the 
good, namely wealth (555b). As for democracy, Plato again uses the phrase “insatiable desire for 
what it defines as the good”, which is freedom in democracy’s case, to explain the cause of its 
destruction (562b). As I’ve pointed out in I.i, it is unlikely that the pursuit of honor causes 
timocracy’s degradation, which rules out the excessive pursuit of what the city sets as good as the 
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universal cause. Instead, I advance the account that it is the enslavement of reason by the other 
parts and the ruling of appetite that cause the degradation of the other cities, and explain why 
reason’s ruling is superior to other parts’ ruling by appealing to the nature of different parts of the 
soul. 
        Before I analyze the individual cases of degradation, there is one more clarification required 
for the argument. I have argued that it is possible for both spirit and appetite to enslave reason and 
force reason to take on its ends, but have yet to explain what it is like for parts other than reason 
to rule in the soul. Debate still exists about the cognitive capacity of each soul part, specifically, 
on whether each part is capable of means-ends reasoning aside from generating its own desires. 
Reason is obviously capable of means-ends reasoning, while people differ on whether appetite 
and/or spirit can generate actions by themselves. The cognitive capacity of the other soul parts 
determines reason’s condition when it is enslaved. If spirit and appetite are capable of means-ends 
reasoning, then reason’s role in an enslaved soul will be minimal. Both the desires and the function 
of reason will be inhibited, effacing reason’s presence in both the decision about the ends and the 
process of generating action for the ends. Reason does not need to take on the ends of the other 
soul parts, because they are cognitively strong enough to generate actions by themselves. However, 
this interpretation is contradicted by reason’s condition in the oligarchic soul, where “(appetite) 
won’t allow… (the rational part) to reason about or examine anything except how a little money 
can be made into great wealth” (553d).  
        The competing account suggests that spirit and appetite cannot directly produce action and 
have to rely on reason for means-ends reasoning, which is more consistent with the passage quoted 
above. According to this account, the form of enslavement will be that spirit or appetite forces 
reason to perform means-ends reasoning about their desires and generate actions through the 
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compelled aid of reason. In this case, reason’s role in the soul is still significant albeit its 
enslavement. One difficulty for this account is explaining how spirit and appetite can move reason 
to perform means-ends reasoning about goals that are incompatible with reason’s own goals, 
especially since they are not capable of means-ends reasoning themselves. In other words, it seems 
like the action of forcing reason to take on foreign ends requires some kind of means-ends 
reasoning, which the other parts are not granted under this interpretation. I recognize the existence 
of this puzzle, but do not aim to resolve it in this chapter. I take on Gavrielides’s approach18 and 
suggest that the nuance about reason’s state does not affect the statement that an individual as a 
person can pursue the ends of spirit or appetite when her soul is ruled by one of those parts, which 
is the premise needed for my following argument.   
          In a timocracy, the ruler’s soul is ruled by spirit. Although spirit’s ends do not directly cause 
the ruler to secretly desire private property and bend laws to fulfill this desire, which eventually 
transforms the constitution into oligarchy, the rule of spirit should be held accountable for this 
process due to its negligence of fine education. In 548b-c, Plato points out that timocrats enjoy the 
secret pleasure of spending because they value physical training more than music and poetry, the 
two things that can condition spirit to align with reason’s goals. As a result, timocrats can only 
refrain from spending their own money by the forceful command of spirit. At 549a-b, Plato claims 
that the timocratic youth shares the money-loving nature because he does not have reason as the 
guardian in the soul, which is the only thing that can preserve virtues for a lifetime. In other words, 
it is only through the rule of reason in the soul that an individual can resist the desires and impulses 
produced by appetite. Under spirit’s ruling, it is just a matter of time before the soul falls under the 
rule of appetite, which explains why reason’s rule has more stability than spirit’s rule. To conclude, 
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spirit’s ruling is inferior to reason’s ruling because a soul under spirit’s ruling will eventually be 
ruled by appetite, whereas reason’s ruling ensures that appetite will always be under control. 
Spirit’s rule is therefore both instrumentally bad and intrinsically bad, in the sense that it both leads 
the soul to further degradation and lacks virtue in its own ends. It is important to note that it is not 
the case that spirit’s ends are naturally aligned with appetite’s ends. Rather, it is because spirit by 
itself does not have sufficient resources to restrain appetite. In a timocracy, spirit may be able to 
preserve some true beliefs from kallipolis, which in turn let it restrain appetite temporarily. 
Simultaneously, spirit’s own desire may drive it to subdue appetite, since a person can better 
pursue honor when appetite is restrained. However, due to the lack of fine education and the real 
understanding of justice, the timocratic individual eventually lets appetite take over her soul. We 
may deduce that both reason’s ends and spirit’s force are necessary to restrain appetite19. When 
reason is ruling in the city and in the individual’s soul, reason’s rule is sufficient to ensure both 
necessary conditions, because the fine education will persuade spirit to aid reason’s goals with 
force. In contrast, spirit’s rule is insufficient, because it cannot provide reason’s ends in an 
individual’s soul; nor can it generate the right upbringing in a city.  
         What, then, makes appetite’s rule the most inferior and intrinsically bad? To answer this 
question, we can appeal to the nature of appetite and bodily desires and compare them with the 
nature of reason and rational desires. At 588c, Plato provides analogies for different parts of the 
soul. He compares appetite to “a single kind of multicolored beast with a ring of many heads that 
it can grow and change at will—some from gentle, some from savage animals,” which shows that 
appetitive desires are multi-formed, changing and growing, and not unified. Spirit is visualized as 
a lion and reason as a human being. The beast, the lion, and the human being are joined together 
																																																						
19 I will discuss the role of force in reason’s rule in more detail in II. ii. 
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to compose one soul. In an unjust soul, the beast and the lion are well fed and strong, and the 
human being is starved and dragged along; the three parts are left to bite and kill one another (588e-
589a). In a just soul, the human being takes control of all parts, domesticates the gentle heads of 
the beast and prevents the savage ones from growing, and makes the lion care for the community 
of all his parts (589a-b). Therefore, the first difference between reason’s ruling and appetite’s 
ruling is that under reason’s rule, different parts of the soul are harmonized, allowing reason to 
pursue its unified goals such as knowledge and virtue, while appetite’s rule inevitably produces 
both necessary and unnecessary bodily desires and causes conflicts among soul parts. The second 
difference is that reason’s rule enables the soul to successfully attain its unified goals, whereas 
appetite’s rule cannot lead to the successful fulfillment of its goals and desires. Under reason’s 
rule, the agent can fulfill her desire by acquiring knowledge of the forms and achieve the goal of 
living a virtuous and good life. Under appetite’s rule, the agent can never fully satisfy the ceaseless 
competing bodily desires that require constant filling and replenishing. The impossibility to fulfill 
one’s desires and achieve one’s goals makes appetite’s rule riotous, with each newly grown desire 
threatening the fulfillment of a former desire and competing for the agent’s energy and attention. 
A similar chaotic state is found in the appetitive cities, where the rich and the poor are constantly 
at war. The nature of appetite’s rule determines its unstable structure and makes the life in a 
degraded city inferior to the life in kallipolis, which is unified by reason’s rule and reason’s 
harmonious goals. 
        To conclude, the degradation in cities other than kallipolis is caused by the enslavement of 
reason by spirit or appetite and the rule of the soul by these lower soul parts. The rule of spirit is 
unstable because spirit lacks the resources to restrain appetite from growing, with the latter 
eventually becoming the ruler of the individual who rules the city. Under appetite’s rule, the soul 
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is full of ceaseless, competing desires and conflicts between different parts. A person whose soul 
is ruled by appetite, and a city ruled by such a person, do not have a unified set of goals and cannot 
achieve their ends, leaving the person and the city in internal riots. 
II. The Badness of the Degraded Cities 
i. Significance of the Question  
        One may find the question about the badness of the degraded cities redundant, since a declined 
regime by definition is worse off than its precedent, and a city that lasts is better than a city that 
decays. However, it is hard to explain the increasing badness of the four degraded cities merely by 
longevity or stability, if stability is taken to mean a state without change or degradation. It is 
important to note that kallipolis is a regime that eventually declines, whereas tyranny, at the 
pinnacle of injustice, does not have a worse form to degrade to. If a state free from degradation is 
the ultimate bad-making feature, then tyranny would be deemed a better constitution than 
kallipolis, which is the opposite to Plato’s ranking. Although the lack of stability is indeed a bad-
making feature according to Plato’s metaphysics, there must be other features that can explicate 
the increase of injustice and undesirability in the declined cities. Even though instability can 
partially account for the fundamental badness of the degraded cities, one still needs to press on the 
underlying question of what makes instability bad. One may appeal to Plato’s metaphysics, as 
mentioned above, and argue that instability indicates a lack of being. Alternatively, one may look 
for more practical explanations, such as that people don’t enjoy living in a city with political 
turmoil and thus that instability is empirically undesirable. Therefore, even if instability counts as 
an answer to the second question, it fails to be a comprehensive or exhaustive one. 
        Since I have been using the word “longevity” in conjunction with “stability”, it is important 
to clarify that although persistence may be part of what stability is, stability does not merely refer 
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to diachronic persistence, but also to an internal state. Plato would argue a philosopher’s life, even 
if it lasts for a short time, would be more choice-worthy than a tyrant’s long life, precisely because 
it has virtue and harmony, which contribute to an internal stability that is lacking in the tyrant’s 
life. In other words, Plato is not only concerned about which kind of constitution lasts longer, but 
cares more about which constitution is in fact the best to live in. Plato wants to demonstrate that 
the degraded cities are worse-off than the just city. It is not merely the fact that they end up in 
destruction that makes them worse than kallipolis, which also degrades eventually, but that they 
are worse to live in while they last. Therefore, the badness of degradation cannot be simply 
explained by the fact that the degraded cities degrade.  
        In my attempt to answer the second question, I seek to identify a feature that can successfully 
address the order of degradation, in the sense that the extent or degree of this bad-making feature 
should increase as the regime declines. I consider and reject Gavrielides’s explanation that the 
degraded cities are inferior because they have the wrong kind of unity (a unity by force) 20while 
the unity in kallipolis, under the rule of reason, is a unity by persuasion. My rejection of the account 
is based on three reasons. First, it is questionable whether Plato grants unity at all to the degraded 
cities, which undermines the existence of the first kind of unity in the degraded cities and the 
distinction between two kinds of unity on the city level. Furthermore, the distinction is invalid, 
even if unity exists, since the rule of reason also inevitably involves force, given the beastly nature 
of appetite. Lastly, it is difficult to explicate with unity by force the gradation of badness, namely, 
the progressive degree of badness and injustice as the city degrades. Since the unity in each 
degraded city is the same kind, it is not clear that the force of rule is stronger in a more degraded 
regime. Although Gavrielides recognizes this last flaw and appeals to a different account to explain 
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the progression of badness, I argue that a well-rounded account ought to explain both the badness 
and the gradation of badness. I propose instead that the badness of the degraded cities comes from 
their degrading ends. It is the deteriorating objects of desire in each degraded city that accounts 
for the gradation of badness. 
ii. Objection to Gavrielides 
Gavrielides (2010) argues that the difference between reason’s rule and other parts’ rule is  
not that reason’s rule is the only kind that can ensure unity and stability in the soul, but that the 
unity in the degenerate souls is the wrong kind, which is a unity by force, as opposed to unity by 
persuasion under reason’s rule. Gavrielides believes that the ability of the degenerate rulers to 
organize their lives indicates their internal unity (p. 206). He claims that, since each degenerate 
character is capable of means-ends reasoning as a whole person (p. 207) and the degradation is 
transgenerational21 (father-to-son) instead of individual (p. 209), the degenerate souls are unified 
and stable. However, when lower parts are ruling in the soul, unity is made possible by force, 
which is unpleasant and unattractive (p. 210). Since the lower parts do not care for the community 
of soul parts and cannot plan actions on behalf of the whole soul, they cannot produce the same 
kind of unity as reason does (p. 211). The timocrat, for example, only abides the law out of fear of 
punishment, which is a sign of rule by force (p. 213). In the oligarch’s soul, reason is forcefully 
enslaved by appetite (p. 213), and the oligarch forcibly holds her dronish appetites in check (p. 
214). Similarly, the democrat still forcefully holds her dronish appetites in check (p. 215). Force 
and tension are also present in the tyrant’s soul, which is full of slavery and disorder (p. 216). 
Gavrielides realizes that this account does not explain how degenerate souls are worse than each 
other and argues that gradation should not be explained by the degree of force, but by the extent 
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to which each degenerate individual resembles the person ruled by reason (p. 217). He further 
points out that rule by persuasion is superior to rule by force because only a soul ruled by 
persuasion can possess virtue (p. 221).  
         I reject Gavrielides’s account for three reasons. First of all, the fact that the degenerate 
characters are capable of means-ends reasoning and ordering their lives around good-dependent 
desires does not prove their unity by Plato’s standards, which exceed the functioning of the agent 
and require internal agreement and harmony. At 422e-423a, Plato points out that any city other 
than kallipolis does not deserve to be called one city, because it is in fact two cities—those of the 
rich and the poor—at war with one another. The presence of war is not only due to conflicts of 
distinct desires between different classes of people, but also because they prioritize the fulfillment 
of their desires over the well-being of the city as a whole. According to the city-soul analogy, the 
degenerate individual shares characteristics with the corresponding degenerate cities. As a key 
feature of the degenerate cities, inner conflicts are also present in the degenerate individual’s soul. 
More importantly, within the degenerate souls, not only do different parts have different ends, the 
soul parts also do not agree on what is best for the soul as a whole. Appetite and spirit lack the 
capacity to judge what is best for the whole soul, while reason does not have the means to achieve 
its end, namely unification of the soul parts. Furthermore, despite Gavrielides’s belief that the 
ability to organize life around an object of desire proves unity, each of the degenerate cities also 
has a corresponding goal (honor, money, freedom, etc.), yet the possession and pursuit of these 
goals do not qualify them as unified cities. Given these similarities between the city and the 
individual soul, it would be strange if Plato is willing to grant unity to the individuals when he 
denies unity to the corresponding cities.  
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        A potential problem with using the city-soul analogy to disprove the unity of degenerate souls 
is that the classes at war in the city are the rich and the poor, whereas the parts at war in the soul 
are reason, spirit, and appetite. This disparity reveals the bigger problem that there may not exist 
three corresponding classes in the degraded cities at all. I argue that despite the absence of three 
classes, the degraded cities can still have groups of people whose souls are naturally rational, 
spirited, or appetitive. I proved in section I.i that there can be wise people in the degraded cities 
and the same should apply to spirited people. For example, in the democratic city, the rich people 
are described as “naturally most organized” (564e), a trait that is often related to good means-ends 
reasoning and the capacity of achieving personal goals. It is therefore safe to say that their reason 
is naturally stronger than the poorer working class, who “work with their own hands” (565a), a 
description that resembles the producer class in kallipolis, whose appetitive part is naturally the 
strongest. In the tyrannical city, the tyrant is portrayed as ruthless in acquiring wealth and 
resources, which renders her and her bodyguards the rich class. At the same time, the tyrant is 
highly calculative and tactical, using lies to mislead people into trusting her and bribing the 
bodyguards to ensure her power, which proves that she also has strong reason. In this sense, the 
war between the rich and the poor in degenerate cities can be understood as the war between reason 
and appetite. 
My second objection is focused on the validity of the distinction between unity by persuasion 
and unity by force. Gavrielides suggests that reason’s rule employs persuasion instead of force to 
unify different parts of the soul. The only direct evidence for such differentiation appears at 548c, 
where Plato points out that timocrats “haven’t been educated by persuasion but by force,” which 
seems like a contrast between reason’s rule and spirit’s rule. The context of this sentence is that 
the timocrats value physical training more than music and poetry and thus are not educated by 
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persuasion but by force. However, the difference drawn here is between two types of education in 
the two constitutions, instead of two kinds of rule in the soul. It is crucial to note that having 
naturally strong reason is not sufficient for reason to rule and proper education is required for the 
right condition of the soul. At 441e, Plato claims that it is the mixture of music and poetry and 
physical training that nurtures reason and soothes spirit. With these trainings, reason and spirit 
learn their proper roles in the soul and govern appetite together. Therefore, persuasion of the soul 
parts comes from proper education and both reason and spirit are on the receiving end of 
persuasion.  
Now that it is clear that it is not reason doing the persuasion but the education, Gavrielides’s 
view may be modified this way: when reason rules in the city, it provides the education that unifies 
the soul by persuasion, while when lower parts rule in the city, they can only provide an inferior 
education that unifies the soul by force. This modified account, albeit more accurate than the 
original one, is still false because the receivers of education do not include appetite. As the 
animalistic and beastly part, appetite is not capable of understanding human language. Given the 
nature of appetite, reason and spirit must employ some degree of force to restrain appetite’s 
growth, which also explains why physical training is included in the proper education. Appetite is 
a name given to a variety of desires that are related to the body and the material, which can be 
categorized into necessary desires and non-necessary desires. When reason is ruling, it allows the 
agent to fulfill the necessary desires that contribute to the person’s well-being, such as the 
nourishment of the body or the acquirement of wealth to sustain one’s life. These are the portions 
of appetite that reason tames and befriends. However, there are other appetites whose growth (and 
even existence) reason seeks to restrain. The lawless desires such as the desires to murder and 
incest threaten the well-being of the person. In the small number of virtuous people, these desires 
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are said to be “eliminated entirely or only a few weak ones remain” (571c). The elimination of 
lawless desires necessarily involves force, because it is impossible to make a beastly desire 
disappear by mere persuasion. Nevertheless, reason’s rule does not aim to eradicate all appetitive 
desires but rather to subdue the unnecessary appetitive desires so that the necessary, gentle part of 
appetite can remain a proper size and perform its proper task, which is to support the body and the 
material life. In kallipolis, the producer class, which consists of appetitive people, is ruled by the 
philosophers so that they can perform their jobs and provide material sustenance for the whole city 
without becoming lazy or greedy. In this sense, the force in reason’s rule is compatible with 
reason’s aim to harmonize and befriend lower parts of the soul.  
My last critique of Gavrielides’s account points to a flaw that he addresses in his paper, whose 
solution I find wanting. Gavrielides recognizes that it is difficult to explain the progression of 
badness in the degenerate cities by appealing to force, because it is not clear that the force of rule 
increases in each degenerate city or soul. Therefore, he argues that it is wrong to think of force in 
terms of degree. Instead, we should think of force as a kind of rule—the degraded cities all belong 
to the same kind of rule, which is unity by force, and the kind does not account for the degree of 
their degradation. He proposes that the gradation of badness should instead be understood by the 
extent to which each degenerate character’s actions and responses resemble those of the person 
ruled by reason. However, Gavrielides cannot dodge the problem with this alternative account. 
Plato sets up the degenerate cities in such a way that their gradation of injustice and badness is 
prominent for the story. It is reasonable to expect that the feature that accounts for the badness of 
the cities also comes in degrees. To separate the bad-making feature and the account for the 
gradation of badness is therefore intuitively problematic.  
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Perhaps Gavrielides can save his account by saying that the bad-making feature does not need 
to account for the explication of the degree of badness, as long as they are not completely unrelated. 
For example, a person can be evil because she enjoys harming others, which is a bad-making 
feature. Yet the degree of her evilness can be determined by how many evil thoughts she holds or 
how many crimes she has committed, instead of how much she enjoys harming others, and thereby 
the bad-making feature is separated from the account for the degree of badness. Yet at the same 
time, the account for degree of badness is not entirely isolate from the bad-making feature, because 
having evil thoughts and committing crimes are manifestations of, or caused by, an enjoyment of 
harming others. Gavrielides’s account may be understood in a similar way. Although the bad-
making feature in the degenerate souls, namely unity by force, cannot be used to account for the 
progressive degree of badness, we may try to find some relation between the bad-making feature 
and the account of the gradation of badness. Analogous to the “evil thought” example, the lack of 
resemblance of the person ruled by reason can be understood as a manifestation of being unified 
in the wrong way. Hence the bad-making feature of the degenerate souls and the account of the 
gradation of badness are connected. Yet we can still press on this connection and ask why the 
extent of resemblance decreases as the badness of the soul increases. The only plausible answer 
seems to be this: the degenerate soul becomes more unified by force, and less unified by 
persuasion, as the degradation proceeds, which makes the degenerate individual resemble the 
individual ruled by reason less and less. This answer raises a new problem for Gavrielides. If the 
increasing degree of badness can be explained in terms of decreasing unity by persuasion, then the 
proposed bad-making feature, unity by force, is not doing explanatory work. We can simply say 
that the degenerate souls are bad because they are not unified by persuasion, or even because they 
are not ruled by reason, and as they become less and less so, their resemblance of the person ruled 
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by reason decreases, which accounts for the gradation of badness. Therefore, despite my best effort 
to save it, Gavrielides’s account fails as a satisfactory one.  
I argue that a more satisfying explanation of badness needs to account for the increasing degree 
of badness through the progression of degradation, which means that the bad-making feature of 
the degenerate souls can be understood in terms of degree. In the next section, I will provide such 
an explanation. 
iii. An Alternative Account of Badness 
        In the last section, I pointed out that Gavrielides’s explanation of why the degenerate 
individuals are bad is problematic. I now propose an alternative account, which argues that the 
badness of the degraded cities and individuals should be explained by their degraded ends, which 
are respectively honor, wealth, freedom, and lawlessness 22 . These degraded ends lead the 
degenerate individuals to organize their lives around wrong pursuits and cause them to have false 
beliefs. I argue that this account is not subject to the objections raised for Gavrielides. On one 
hand, it does not touch upon the issue of unity at all. As I have argued in the last section, I do not 
intend to grant unity to the degraded cities or souls. If anything, the lack of unity is a bad-making 
feature in the degenerate cities and souls, although it is hard to account for the gradation of badness 
with this feature, which is why I do not appeal to unity in my account. On the other hand, degraded 
ends can successfully account for the gradation of badness. As we move down on the list of 
degenerate individuals, their degraded ends cause them to have more appetitive desires and 
																																																						
22	The tyrant’s object of desire is not as clear as the other degenerate individuals. Mark Johnstone 
(2015) argues that the tyrant’s soul is ruled by the “erotic love” (572e) that drives the tyrant to 
pursue all kinds of bodily desires (including the lawless ones). I accept his account. However, it 
is important to differentiate the ruler of the soul and the object of desire of the ruler. It seems like 
what the erotic love most distinctly wants is the fulfillment of lawless desires that are 




generate increasing false beliefs. I consider two potential responses to my account, one of which I 
will resolve within this chapter while the other one will be more fully addressed in the next chapter.  
        Plato structures the tale of the degenerate individuals and regimes in such a way that each 
regime or individual is paired with a distinct end. Such an arrangement is not coincidental for Plato 
believes that having the right pursuit is the precondition of becoming a virtuous person. At 489e, 
Plato points out that “to become a fine and good person” one has to “be guided by the truth and 
always pursue it in every way”. The degraded cities and individuals, guided by their false ends, 
mistake wrong things for the good and organize their lives around that which they have mistaken 
for the good instead of knowledge and virtue. Because of their degraded ends, the degenerate 
individual cannot access truth or possess virtue. The timocratic city and individual praise honor as 
the highest good. Because of their pursuit of honor, they value physical training without learning 
music and poetry and therefore lack real understanding of virtue. The oligarchic city and individual 
value wealth the most and their desire for money leaves no room for the desire of spirit or reason. 
The desire for money lets in the greatest of all evils, which allows the oligarch to sell all her 
possessions for money and live in the city without performing any real job (552a). The democratic 
city and individual value freedom the most and therefore admit all kinds of constitutions in the city 
and the soul. Freedom drives them to treat necessary and unnecessary desires as equal, making the 
democrat the first to fulfill her unnecessary desires. The tyrannical city and individual praise 
lawlessness and let the lawless desires drive the city and soul wild. They prioritize the fulfillment 
of unnecessary desires, especially the lawless ones that are suppressed in all the other cities. 
         As the regime degenerates, the end of the city becomes more inferior and gives rise to 
stronger and/or numerous desires, which helps to explain the increase of badness as a result of the 
degradation. When timocracy becomes oligarchy, appetite takes over in the soul and enslaves the 
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former ruler, namely spirit, and the pursuit of the city changes from honor to wealth. Given the 
distinct natures of spirit and appetite, the desires generated by them differ in type. As I pointed out 
in section I. iii, a timocrat can still preserve some true beliefs and have a superficial understanding 
of virtues, which shows that the desire for honor does not eliminate or directly opposes virtue. Yet 
the desire for money, being an appetitive desire, is “so opposed (to virtue) that if they were set on 
a scales, they’d always incline in opposite directions” (550e). As such, the more a person values 
money-making, the less they value virtue (550e). This difference in their relations with virtue 
shows that the desire for money not only belongs to the different category of bodily desires, it is 
also inferior to the desire for honor. Moreover, the desire for money increases as timocracy 
transforms to oligarchy, both on the individual level and on the city level—the ruling class first 
finds ways to spend money themselves, then bends the laws to satisfy their growing desires and 
their wives’, and eventually makes the majority of the citizens share their value and pursuit of 
money (550d-e). Therefore, compared to timocracy’s end, oligarchy’s end is inferior in kind and 
shared by more. When oligarchy becomes democracy, the pursuit of the city shifts from wealth to 
freedom. Under the pursuit of freedom, the democrat admits unnecessary desires into the soul, and 
fulfills them equally with necessary desires. Clearly, there is an increase in the number of desires 
when oligarchy transforms to democracy. Moreover, since unnecessary desires are “harmful both 
to the body and to the reason and moderation of the soul,” (559b) they are an inferior kind of desire 
compared to the necessary ones, which are beneficial to one’s health and well-being (559a). 
Similarly, in the transformation from oligarchy to tyranny, we see an increase both in the number 
of desires and the kind of desires. The tyrant’s soul is ruled by a powerful erotic love,  which drives 
the agent mad in her pursuit of all kinds of bodily desires, including the vicious, lawless ones that 
are suppressed in the other types of souls. The pursuit of lawlessness makes the tyrant the most 
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enslaved and miserable individual due to both the potency and proliferation of her desires. Based 
on the description of the tyrant, she possesses all of the same kinds of bodily desires as the oligarch 
and democrat. However, the strongest desires in her soul are the lawless desires. Therefore, it is 
arguable that the acquiring of wealth may simply be a means for the tyrant to satisfy her lawless 
desires. The fulfillment of all kinds of bodily desires fully occupy the tyrant’s life, making it 
impossible for her to enjoy freedom or friendship, even for a day (576a). As the city degrades, its 
desired end becomes more inferior and causes stronger desires to proliferate, which accounts for 
the increased badness across the degenerate regimes. 
        The degraded ends not only produce more bodily desires in the soul as the degradation 
proceeds but also reduce the correct beliefs in the soul. The timocrat preserves some true beliefs, 
such as that one should guard one’s city against enemies and that the ruling class should not possess 
wealth or enjoy spending their own money. The oligarch does not share the timocrat’s beliefs about 
protecting one’s city or refraining from spending, but still knows that unnecessary desires are bad 
and should be held in check. The democrat doesn’t believe in controlling unnecessary desires, but 
has the true belief that the lawless desires should be suppressed. The tyrant, who has purged all 
reason from the soul, does not believe in any rules or virtues. The loss of true beliefs is directly 
related to the false goods praised by  the degraded cities because the fulfillment of bodily desires 
causes a person to attach false value to material and physical things. In Book V, Plato talks about 
the epistemic consequence of pursuing material things. The lovers of sight and sound believe in 
the many beautiful things but not the form of the Beautiful itself (479a). These people cannot have 
true beliefs because the many beautiful things are objects of opinion, instead of knowledge. The 
material things that the appetitive people seek come into being and eventually come out of being 
(decay), they participate in both being and not being (478e). Since only immaterial things, such as 
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virtue, participate in being and people can only know the things that participate in being, the lovers 
of the material things cannot have knowledge. In the Phaedo, Plato describes the way that physical 
pleasures and pains drag the soul towards the body—“every pleasure and every pain 
provides…another nail to rivet the soul to the body and to weld them together” (83c). Since each 
degenerate individual has more appetitive desires than her predecessor, it is not surprising that the 
true beliefs in the soul becomes less and less as the degradation progresses. 
        I have shown that the degraded ends can account for the gradation of badness because they 
produce increasing bodily desires and reduce true beliefs in the soul. I now consider two potential 
objections to this account. The first objection to this account (and any account that attempts at a 
single explanation for the badness in all the degraded cities) is questioning whether such an attempt 
is valid. After all, the degraded cities are vastly different from each other and Plato treats each one 
distinctly without giving a unified account of all the regimes. Perhaps this omission indicates that 
Plato himself does not believe that a unified account of the badness of the degraded regimes exists 
and each case should be treated on its own. Why does there need to be a unified account for the 
badness of each regime when each one may be bad in its own way? I argue that, although each 
degraded regime has its own distinct end, these ends share a similarly bad nature in that they all 
lead the city and the soul away from knowledge and virtue and hence count as a unified bad-
making feature across the degraded regimes. It is true that Plato does not explicitly point to one 
bad-making feature in his description of the regimes, yet the badness of all the degraded ends is 
captured by his description of appetite, and the proliferation of appetitive desires is the inevitable 
result of the degraded ends. Plato recognizes that this part of the soul is multiform (580e) yet he 
still calls it by one name instead of referring to each component separately. It is due to the 
multiform nature of the appetitive part that there exist three regimes (instead of one) in which the 
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appetitive part rules. Each regime is ruled by a different component of the appetitive soul part 
whose badness gradually increases. Although timocracy is not ruled by appetite, it is ruled by a 
part that cannot restrain appetite, allows appetitive desires to grow, and eventually gives in to 
appetite’s rule. The fact that all the degraded ends and the desires associated with them are related 
to the appetitive part shows that a unified account of the bad-making feature is not only possible 
but also valid.   
        Another potential objection derives from the “hydraulic model” of desire.23 Plato claims at 
485d that “when someone’s desires incline strongly for one thing, they are thereby weakened for 
others, just like a stream that has been partly diverted into another channel.” This analogy seems 
to suggest that there is a fixed amount of desiderative energy24 in a person’s soul, which appears 
to be in tension with my account, especially in the tyrant’s case. According to the proposed 
account, the degenerate regimes are increasingly bad because their ends become increasingly 
inferior and their desires become more numerous in kind and stronger in strength. At the end of 
degradation, the tyrant seeks the satisfaction of all kinds of lawless desires in a drunken and 
frenzied state. It seems that the tyrant has more desiderative energy than the other individuals, 
which is inconsistent with the hydraulic model. I believe that this is a valid worry both for my 
account and for Plato, and will resolve the inconsistency in the next chapter.  
Conclusion 
        In this chapter, I examined the cause of degradation in each city and came up with a unified 
account for the badness of degradation. I argued that the cause of degradation is the enslavement 
																																																						
23 Lane (2007), p. 45. 
24	Desiderative energy refers to the energy or capacity for desiring, which indicates the extent to 
which a person wants something. When a person’s desiderative energy towards A is higher than 
her desiderative energy towards B, she desires A more than B.	
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of reason by the lower parts of the soul and explicated why the rule of reason is superior to the rule 
of other parts as well as why the rule of reason is necessary for the stability and unity of the soul. 
I rejected Gavrielides’s account for the badness of the degraded cities and offered an alternative 
account that can explicate the gradation of badness across the degenerate regimes. The alternative 
account argues that a unified bad-making feature across the degraded cities is their degraded ends, 
which give rise to increasing and stronger bodily desires as the degradation progresses. I defended 
this account against the challenge of the validity of a unified account and will consider a more 





















        At the end of Chapter II, I highlighted a potential objection to my proposed account of the 
bad-making feature of the degraded cities. The objection was the following: Plato endorses a 
“hydraulic model” of desire,25 which compares a person’s desiderative energy to a stream and her 
desires to channels in the stream; when the water in the stream is directed to one channel, there is 
less water entering another channel (485d). The hydraulic model seems to imply that there is a 
fixed amount of water in the stream of desiderative energy, which contradicts with my proposal 
that the number, kind, and strength of desires increase in the soul as the degradation proceeds. 
There exist two tensions between the fixity of water and the increase of desires. First off, the 
increase in the number and kinds of desires entails an increase in the number of channels. To 
resolve this tension, I argue that since the increase of channels does not entail an increase in the 
total quantity of water, the proliferation of number and kind of desires is compatible with Plato’s 
hydraulic model. The division of desiderative energy also helps to account for the disunity of the 
degenerate souls that I asserted in the previous chapter. A deeper worry is that the increase in the 
strength of desire shows an increase in the quantity of water, which does seem in conflict with the 
fixity of desiderative energy. Opponents of my view may think that this tension indicates the 
inaccuracy of my interpretation of Plato’s tyrant. Yet textual evidence shows that there exists an 
apparent tension between Plato’s model and his portrayal of the tyrant, whose desiderative energy 
is significantly higher than the other degenerate characters. I argue that the tension can be resolved 
with an alternative interpretation of the hydraulic model. Although it is natural to assume that the 
																																																						
25 Lane (2007), p. 45.  
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hydraulic model implies fixity of desiderative energy, Plato does not need to commit to fixity. Just 
like a stream whose volume is subject to change by the climate, the stream of desiderative energy 
can have varying quantity of energy over time. The tyrant acquires more motivational desire when 
the tyrant-makers plant a powerful erotic love in her soul. Yet even with the increased desiderative 
energy, the tyrant must still split it between the pursuits of different desires. The tyrant’s inability 
to satisfy her desires proves the limited nature of desiderative energy, which is the essential feature 
of the hydraulic model and the only feature that Plato needs to commit to. Therefore, I argue that 
my account of the tyrant does not contradict the hydraulic model, but instead helps to shed light 
on how the model ought to be understood.   
I. The Hydraulic Model 
        The context of the hydraulic model is Plato’s discussion with Glaucon about the philosopher’s 
nature in Book VI. At 485d, Plato introduces the model as a premise for the argument that 
philosophers are necessarily moderate and “not at all…money-lover(s)”. Plato begins the argument 
by claiming that, as lovers of learning, philosophers must strive for all kinds of truth from their 
childhood on. Then he brings up the hydraulic model: “Now, as we surely know that, when 
someone’s desires incline strongly for one thing, they are thereby weakened for others, just like a 
stream that has been partly diverted into another channel.” (485d). According to this model, since 
the philosophers’ desires “flow towards learning and everything of that sort”, which belong to 
“pleasures of the soul itself by itself,” (485d) true philosophers will abandon bodily pleasures. 
Therefore, the philosophic nature is moderate and non-appetitive since money does not attract true 
philosophers.  
        The hydraulic model captures the negative correlation between the different amounts of 
desiderative energy (water) directed at different ends or desires (channels): when the amount of a 
		
59	
person’s desiderative energy that is distributed to one end increases, the amount of her desiderative 
energy distributed to the other ends decreases. In the above context, the different ends are pleasures 
of the soul and bodily pleasures.  
        One may question whether the hydraulic model rightly describes the way that motivation and 
desire function: why does directing desiderative energy towards one object decrease the energy 
left for the other? Why are the pursuit of bodily desires and the pursuit of the desires proper to the 
soul mutually exclusive? Are there not people who are as driven regarding learning as they are 
about food and drink? I defend the hydraulic model against these questions with two answers. First 
off, it is empirically true that a person’s energy, time, and attention are limited. Being deeply 
invested in one thing necessarily occupies a person’s time and attention, which decreases the 
amount that she can devote to other activities. Similarly, deep investment in a certain activity is 
both physically and psychologically consuming and it is simply not possible to maintain a high 
level of energy for all kinds of activities. The philosopher, who always pursues the truth in every 
way (490a), is characterized by her dedication to leaning. Plato describes the life style of true 
philosophers, which requires them to “put their minds to youthful education and philosophy and 
take care of their bodies at a time when they are growing into manhood, so as to acquire a helper 
for philosophy,” “increase their mental exercises” “as they grow older,” and “graze freely in the 
pasture of philosophy and do nothing else” after they retire from politics and military service 
(498b). It is not hard to see that Plato’s true philosophers simply do not have the time or 
opportunity to pursue bodily desires as a result of the combination of such an intellectually 
demanding lifestyle and the educational and political systems in kallipolis, which select the gold-
natured children through careful training and examination and make them live communally as the 
rulers of the city. Secondly, once the philosophers embark on their pursuit of knowledge and truth, 
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their true beliefs will lead them to avoid bodily pleasure and pain in order to avoid being subject 
to the power of bodily pleasure to affect one’s correct judgement, make the soul corporeal, and 
lead it astray from the truth. I have discussed the epistemic effect of bodily pleasure in section II. 
iii in the last chapter and will now supplement the discussion with more evidence. In the Phaedo, 
Plato claims that philosophy can free the soul from the body by showing the soul that investigation 
through sensory perception is deceitful. The soul thereby withdraws from the senses so that it only 
trusts itself and the reality (83b). Knowing the deceptive nature of bodily pleasures and pains, a 
soul that is committed to philosophy will not surrender itself to pleasures and pains again (84a). 
Since the philosopher’s devotion to truth determines her decreased bodily desires, the hydraulic 
model makes a strong case for the philosopher’s distribution of desiderative energy.  
        Likewise, the hydraulic model applies to those who pursue bodily pleasures. In the Phaedo, 
Plato points out that bodily desires can cause war, which comes from the desire for wealth, and 
the pursuit of wealth as well as other bodily desires enslaves the soul for these ends and make a 
person “too busy to practice philosophy” (66d). The war caused by bodily desires can be further 
explained by the way that appetite rules the soul, which I described in section I. iii in the last 
chapter. When a person is motivated by bodily desires, the internal chaos between different desires 
will keep her occupied. Thus, she will not have spare energy to pursue objects proper to the soul. 
Moreover, as I have indicated above, the pursuit of bodily desires has an opposing effect to the 
pursuit of knowledge and truth. Hence, the hydraulic model applies to both philosophers and 
money-lovers. 
II. The Increase of Channels 
        I pointed out in the last chapter that, as the degradation proceeds, there is an increase in the 
number and kind of desires in the degenerate regimes. This helps to account for the gradation of 
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badness through the process of degradation. In terms of the hydraulic model, the number of 
channels increases as the number and kind of desires increase. However, the analogy between 
desiderative energy and water in a stream seems to suggest that there is a fixed amount of 
desiderative energy available in a person’s soul, just like there is a limited amount of water in a 
stream. If the amount of water in the previously existent channels remains the same and water will 
flow in the newly added channels, then an increase in the number of channels will entail an increase 
in the total quantity of water in the stream, which creates a problem for the hydraulic model.  
        I resolve the above problem by identifying the falsehood in the assumption that the amount 
of water in the formerly existent channels remains the same as the number of channels increase: 
when there are more channels in the stream, the water in the existent channels is diverted into the 
new channels, and there is, on average, less water in each channel due to this diversion. Plato does 
not believe that the proliferation of desires necessarily indicates a higher level of desiderative 
energy. In fact, oppositely, his account of the degenerate characters suggests that when there are 
more channels in the stream, the amount of water directed to each channel is thereby lower. The 
best example is the democrat, who satisfies both necessary desires and unnecessary desires equally, 
and therefore is known for the variety of her desires. Based on Plato’s description of the democrat’s 
life, the democrat is not invested in the pursuit of any one of her desires particularly, at least not 
to the extent that the precedent degenerate characters (the timocrat and the oligarch) pursue their 
ends (honor and wealth). Plato describes the democrat’s life as follow: “And so he lives on, 
yielding day by day to the desire at hand. Sometimes he drinks heavily while listening to the flute; 
at other times, he drinks only water and is on a diet; sometimes he goes in for physical training; at 
other times, he’s idle and neglects everything; and sometimes he even occupies himself with what 
he takes to be philosophy…If he happens to admire soldiers, he’s carried in that direction, if 
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money-makers, in that one” (561c-d). The democrat takes on many ends, but pursues each one in 
a random and casual manner. In comparison, real soldiers like the timocrats pursue honor 
relentlessly, engaging in physical training at young age and warfare in adulthood. Likewise, real 
money-makers such as the oligarchs organize their lives around compiling wealth. Clearly, the 
democrat does not desire these ends to the same extent, which also explains the qualification to 
the “philosophy” that the democrat does, because only those that direct all of their energy towards 
learning can engage in true philosophy. Therefore, although the democrat is capable of desiring 
the same ends as the philosopher king, the timocrat, and oligarch, there is a significant decrease in 
the strength of her desire for these ends; despite more channels in the stream, there is much less 
water in each channel. Since the addition of ends does not increase desiderative energy, the 
increase in channels does not entail the increase in the total amount of water in the stream. 
        The proliferation of desires leading to less desiderative energy being directed towards each 
desire accounts for the degenerate characters’ difficulty in satisfying their desires as well as their 
lack of well-being. Among all people, the philosophers have the most unified desires, which means 
that there is the least division of channels in their stream and almost all of their water flows to one 
channel. For the philosopher the channel of bodily desires still exists for the purposes of health 
and sustenance, yet only a small quantity of water flows in that channel. Because the philosophers’ 
ends are the least divided, their desiderative energy for their desired end is the highest. The 
philosophers desire learning and knowledge so much that they are willing to endure the arduous 
process of acquiring the truth, which Plato compares to giving birth (490b). The high desiderative 
energy in the philosophers makes them the most likely to fulfill their desires and achieve their 
ends. The timocrat and the oligarch, in contrast, have more channels in their stream. Hence, in 
comparison to the philosopher, they have less desiderative energy for their main ends. The disunity 
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of their desires makes these desires harder to satisfy, because they cannot fully commit to a single 
desire.  
III. The Increase of Water 
        In the last section, I resolved the tension between the proliferation of desires and the hydraulic 
model and suggested that the increase in the channels does not entail more water in the stream. 
However, if we take the hydraulic model to imply a fixed amount of desiderative energy in the 
soul, there exists another tension between the hydraulic model and my claim that the tyrant’s 
desires increase in strength. This tension poses a more substantial worry for my account of the 
gradation of badness in the degenerate regimes. Potential opponents may use this tension to reject 
my claim that the tyrant’s desiderative energy increases as his desires become stronger. I argue 
that Plato’s description of the tyrant does in fact endorse the increase in desiderative energy. Plato’s 
belief in the possibility of having increased total desiderative energy can be further proved by 
passages from the Gorgias. It will turn out that the tension raised here not only poses a problem 
for my account, but also challenges the consistency between Plato’s accounts of the soul and 
desires in Book VI and Book IX.  
        Plato paints a vivid picture of how the tyrant is created at the beginning of Book IX. When 
the “clever enchanters” and “tyrant-makers” plant a powerful erotic love in a young man’s soul, 
the erotic love becomes the leader of the existent idle desires that spend anything at hand (572e); 
these idle desires are the unnecessary desires that have no moderation and are harmful to a person’s 
well-being. The bodily desires nurture the erotic love, as a tyrant in the soul, making it grow as 
large as possible and then planting the “sting of longing” in the soul (573a). The erotic love “adopts 
madness as its bodyguard and becomes frenzied, purging any true belief or moderate desire from 
the soul until the soul is filled with “imported madness” (573b). The tyrant’s desiderative energy 
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is directed towards gluttony, luxury, promiscuity, and all other extreme forms of bodily indulgence 
(573d). Unlike the democrat whose dominant desire changes, the tyrant appears to desire all the 
mentioned things simultaneously, since these terrible desires are said to exist in the soul by the 
side of the tyrant day and night, growing stronger and stronger (573d). It then follows that not only 
are there more channels in the tyrant’s stream of energy, but there is also more water flowing to 
each channel. In addition, the water in each channel increases over time. The increasingly strong 
desires bid the tyrant to “dare anything that will provide sustenance” (575a). The tyrant does not 
shy away from using violence, force, and enslavement to acquire what she wants. Such shameless 
and lawless pursuit of bodily indulgence suggests that the tyrant is willing to go to greater lengths 
than any other degenerate characters, which also suggests the greater strength of her desires. 
Therefore, Plato’s descriptions of the tyrant’s soul and life clearly indicate a continuous increase 
in the total amount of desiderative energy. 
          We can supplement the argument for Plato’s beliefs about the fluidity of the amount of 
desiderative energy with evidence from the Gorgias. In the Gorgias, Plato refutes the hedonist 
account that is advanced by Callicles. Callicles claims that the happiest life is one where the agent 
can let her appetite grow as large as possible and have the capacity of fulfilling whatever desire 
she feels at the time (492a). Callicles believes that people who possess a natural capacity for 
becoming the ruler in a city should indeed establish themselves as “tyrants” (492c) and live the 
kind of hedonic life that Callicles endorses. Plato does not raise an objection to Callicles’ 
suggestion that an agent’s appetite can grow larger. Nor does he disagree that such an agent can 
be more “competent” in fulfilling her growing desires, in the sense that this agent, when compared 
to a moderate person, can dedicate more time and energy to fulfilling desires. According to the 
“leaky jar” model of pleasure (493e), an appetitive person lives a life of constantly filling the 
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metaphorical jars of desires that keeps leaking, because an unrestrained, insatiable appetite keeps 
generating bodily desires; while a moderate person can relax over them because their desires do 
not proliferate in the same way. The action of constant refilling to avoid pain resembles the tyrant’s 
mad acquisition of sustenance to avoid suffering (574a). The similarity between the tyrant figures 
in the Gorgias and Republic Book IX suggests that Plato consistently endorses an account of the 
tyrant that suggests both bigger appetite and stronger desiderative energy in the soul. The fact that 
the tyrant in the Gorgias is able to both let her appetite grow as much as possible and still be able 
to keep filling more leaky jars demonstrates that Plato does not think that the number of an agent’s 
desiderative energy needs to remain constant as time progresses.  
        A contradiction thereby arises between the tyrant’s case and the interpretation of the hydraulic 
model in section III, which suggests that there is a fixed quantity of water in the stream regardless 
of the number of channels, meaning that there is a fixed amount of desiderative energy in a person’s 
soul no matter how many desires the soul is directed towards. I argue that although this 
interpretation seems intuitively right, it is in fact mistaken—Plato does not need to commit to fixity 
in order to preserve the hydraulic model. 
         As I pointed out in section II, based on the text at 485d, we observe a negative correlation 
between the quantity of desiderative energy directed at one ends and the quantity of desiderative 
energy directed at other ends. It is natural to assume that this negative correlation entails fixity: 
since, when there is more water in one channel, there is less water left for other channels, the total 
amount of water must be fixed. If the quantify of water is subject to change, then the increase of 
flow in one channel will not necessarily lead to the decrease of flow in other channels. Although 
it is true that there is a finite amount of water at any given time, which is what causes the negative 
correlation, it is not clear that the amount of water must be necessarily fixed at different points of 
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time. We can think about the model in relation to the real streams in nature. Surely, at any particular 
point of time, the total amount of water is a constant. Yet it is unlikely that the amount of water in 
a stream is always fixed over time. The quantity of water is subject to changes caused by climate 
conditions. We can still assert that there exists a negative correlation between the amounts of water 
in different channels at a given time, without granting that the amount of water in the stream 
remains consistently fixed at all points of time.  
        Once the fixity claim is removed from the interpretation, we are looking at a modified 
interpretation of the model. I propose that the hydraulic model should be understood as follow: at 
any given time, if a person’s desiderative energy for one end increases, there will be less 
desiderative energy for the other ends. This modified interpretation preserves the key characteristic 
of the hydraulic model, which is the negative correlation between the amounts of desiderative 
energy towards different ends, and successfully accommodates the tyrant’s case. Hence, this 
interpretation is a more accurate reading of Plato’s hydraulic model than the original interpretation.  
        Having argued that the hydraulic model does not entail fixity over time, I offer an explanation 
for the increase in the tyrant’s desiderative energy. Given that the tyrant is the only degenerate 
character whose desiderative energy increases over time, there must be something peculiar in the 
tyrant’s case. I believe that it is the planting of the powerful erotic love that brings more water into 
the tyrant’s stream. Plato’s use of words like “plant” and “imported madness” (573a-b) implies 
that the increasing capacity for desiring comes from external sources, namely the tyrant-makers 
who supply to the desires of the tyrant. Plato also uses the phrase “erotic love” to describe the 
philosophers’ desire for learning, which reflects his belief in the importance of upbringing in a 
persons’ development. Plato believes that the best-natured youth fares the worst when she 
befriends the wrong crowd and receives bad education (491d). The tyrant, as the most unjust 
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character, is the polar opposite of the philosopher. It could be the case that the fine education in 
kallipolis instills a strong desire for learning in the best-natured youth, whose appetitive desires 
become restrained by reason; while the best-natured youth in a degraded city will be used by bad-
natured people for their own purposes and the bad education in the city, along with the crowd of 
tyrant-makers, will supply a strong desire for the wrong end to the youth’s soul, which releases 
and becomes the leader of many more terrible desires in the soul.       
        Before I conclude this chapter, I briefly consider a potential pushback to the new 
interpretation that goes along the line of argument by Callicles: if the tyrant can have an increased 
amount of desiderative energy, why is it the case that she is the most wretched person? Shouldn’t 
she be able to fulfill her beastly desires by all lawless means? I point back to my description of 
appetite’s nature in the second chapter and argue that it is not in fact possible for the tyrant to fulfill 
all her desires, given the chaotic state of the soul under appetite’s rule. Under the rule of the erotic 
love, the tyrant has strong desires for multiple competing ends, which are not harmonized in the 
least. Not only do stronger desires for these ends impede the fulfillment of these desires, but these 
stronger desires will make the internal war between different ends more violent. Moreover, in the 
Republic, the tyrant is the most wretched because she is the character with the least freedom and 
friendship (576a). Although the tyrant appears to be the ruler in a city, she is in fact the slave to 
her bodyguards, who have the worst nature. The crimes of the tyrant are conducted largely to 
acquire sustenance for the bodyguards. She lives in the fear of being overthrown as well as fear of 
experiencing enslavement at the hands of the worst people. She appears to have control of the city, 
while in fact having neither control over her soul or others (579d). For the above reasons, the 
increase of desiderative energy in the tyrant does not guarantee the fulfillment of desires or 




        In this chapter, I resolved the apparent tensions between my proposed account in the second 
chapter and the hydraulic model. I argued that the first tension between the proliferation of number 
and kind of desires is compatible with the common interpretation of hydraulic model. The second 
tension, which is between the increase in the strength of the tyrant’s desires and the supposed fixity 
suggested by the model, shows that Plato is not committed to the fixity of desiderative energy as 
one potential interpretation of the hydraulic model. I proposed that the removal of the fixity claim 
yields a more accurate understanding of the hydraulic model, which is in fact consistent with 



















								This thesis looked at several crucial interpretive issues regarding Plato’s moral psychology in 
the context of the degenerate regimes. In the first chapter, I examined the city-soul analogy and 
proposed two possible conditions suggested by the analogy. The first condition applies in all types 
of constitution except democracy, which lacks a single leadership; and the second condition 
applies to almost all constitutions, although the degree of resemblance between the citizens and 
the constitution may vary. I concluded that the city-soul analogy is valid across all regimes. In the 
second chapter, I explored the cause of degradation in each case, and identified the cause of 
degradation as the enslavement of reason by lower parts of the soul. I offered a unified account for 
the increasing badness in the degenerate regimes, which identifies the bad-making feature as the 
degraded ends and desires, which increase in number, kind, and strength as the degradation 
progresses. In the last chapter, I defended my account against a potential objection, which suggests 
that there is a tension between the increase of desires and the fixity claim in Plato’s hydraulic 
model of desire. I argued that the hydraulic model does not in fact entail fixity of desiderative 
energy overtime, and argued that this interpretation not only saves my account from the objection, 
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